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PANEL I: TELECOMMUNICATIONS
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION
PRINCIPAL PAPERS
THE POST-DEREGULATORY
LANDSCAPE IN
INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW:
A UNIQUE EUROPEAN UNION
APPROACH?
Herbert Burkert∗
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article has two purposes: the first is to provide an ove rview of the developments in telecommunications sector specific
regulation before and after the so called “Telecommunications
Review 1999” (“1999 Communications Review”) of the European Union (“EU” or “European”), with an emphasis on the
“new regulatory package” that has evolved from this review.
After a brief overview of the “constitutional” basis for EU activities in the field of telecom regulation and the regulatory
toolbox available in Part II, a presentation of the key elements
of EU telecom law until the 1999 Communications Review will
follow in Part III, as well as a description of the main issues of
that Review and the consequences as expressed in (the current
state of) the new regulatory package. It should be noted that
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Law, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland; Chairman, Legal Advisory Board
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this post-deregulatory landscape in the EU has not fully
emerged yet. One element of the original package has already
been put into operation: Regulation 2887/2000 of the European
Parliament (“Parliament”) and of the Council of the European
Union (“Council”) of 18 December 2000 on Unbundled Access to
the Local Loop.1 The finalization of the remaining elements of
the package is envisaged for Spring 2002. The Member States
will be obliged to transform the package into national law by
2003. Due to this situation, this Article, when reporting on the
full package, will focus principally on the stage of all proposals
as first presented by the European Commission (“Commission”)
in 2000. Where appropriate, ho wever, reference will be made to
changes which occurred after the Commission reconsidered its
proposals following the First Reading in the Parliament. While
this approach does not fully reflect the state of affairs at the
time of writing, this Article will at least provide the reader
with a timeline which can be used at a later stage to make a
full comparison of the original package with the final outcome.
The second purpose of this Article is to invite — with the
benefit of hindsight, a benefit that should never be left une xploited — another view on these developments: Statements of
the main political actors on past regulatory activities tend to
convey the impression that regardless of any past changes,
each of the previous stages had always been under control and
an inherent logic had always been at work at eve ry step in the
process. Part IV begs to differ from such logification by selecting two issues for closer scrutiny: the “European Regulatory
Authority” that hovers through these regulatory changes like
the “ghost of Christmas yet to come”2 and the revival of the
“public service” concept. It is suggested that rather than being
the consequential outcome of a market-logical sequence of deregulation and re-regulation — some of the changes appear to
be the result of an unpredicted interplay of forces outside telecommunications regulation, forces which will continue to
thwart econocratic regulatory intentions.

1. Parliament and Council Regulation 2887/2000 of 18 December 2000 on
Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, 2000 O.J. (L 336) 4 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Regulation 2887/2000].
2. See CHARLES DICKENS , A C HRISTMAS CAROL (1st ed., Barron’s 1985)
(1843).
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Whether the results — and the results of this regulatory endeavor are not yet evident — will be very much different from
the results once intended is not the point at issue here. The
Article seeks only to provide examples demonstrating that, for
the purpose of comparing regulatory policies in the EU, the
historical, institutional, political and cultural factors in the
regulatory environment in the EU are so important that a very
general level of abstraction is needed to make comparison with
other regulatory regimes meaningful. There is sufficient institutional economics and political science analysis available to
offer appropriate explanations of such “path dependency” and
“institutional constraints.” However, this Article also tries to
convey that such influences should not solely be seen as hindrance, constraints or obstacles to the virtuous path of regulation, but as potent and delicious flavors of regulatory culture.3
The new regulatory package will be the focus of our attention
in tracing the influence of these “soft” framework cond itions.
Clearly, for a complete understanding of the regulatory environment, both competition law and sector specific regulation
must be considered together. Further, recent developments in
competition law have to be taken into account, particularly because of their influence on the specific sector regulation.4 Due
attention will be given to these influences. While there is still
a debate as to whether competition law will eventually replace
sector specific regulation in telecommunications, there is a basic understanding that sector specific regulation for the time
being is still necessary and the new regulatory package is material proof of this belief.
3. On such a “constraints” and “path” oriented comparison between the
U.S. and EU approaches, albeit restricted to the area of rate rebalancing, see
Barbara A. Cherry & Johannes M. Bauer, Institutional Arrangements and
Rate Rebalancing: Empirical Evidence from the United States and Europe,
Paper Presented at the Thirteenth Biennial Conference of the International
Telecommunications
Society
(July
2-5,
2000),
available
at
http://www.its2000.org.ar/conference/cherry_bauer.pdf.
4. See Commission Working Document on Proposed New Regulatory
Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services: Draft
Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Calculation of Significant Market
Power under Article 14 of the Proposed Directive on a Common Regulatory
Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services,
COM(01)175 final [hereinafter Commission Working Document on Proposed
New Regulatory Framework].
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Since the early beginnings, not only EU telecommunications
law, but EU law, EU institutions and even the terminology of
the EU as such have been (and continue to be) subject to constant change. Therefore, the following terminological clarifications may be useful:
(1) “EU” in this Article identifies what in correct termino logy
is the “European Community” (“EC” or “Community”), i.e., the
first pillar of the three pillar structure of the EU introduced
with the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) — Maastricht
Treaty — in force since November 1, 1993. 5 The other two pillars are the common foreign and security policy and the cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs.
(2) The primary legal source for EU telecommunication law
is the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC
Treaty”).6 This treaty was last amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force on May 1, 1999. 7 Among other
things, the Treaty of Amsterdam changed the numbe ring of the
EC Treaty. To avoid confusion, this Article will refer to the EC
Treaty using the post-Amsterdam numbering system, even in
cases of pre-Amsterdam applications.
II. THE L EGAL FRAMEWORK OF EU ACTIVITIES
A. The Constitutional Framework for Telecommunications
The EU institutions draw their regulatory and policy making
power from the treaties as their primary source of legitimacy.
The EC Treaty provides several references to telecommunications: (1) Articles 154 to 156, introduced in the Maastricht
Treaty as Article 129(b)-(d), explicitly refer to telecommunications policy goals under the heading of “Trans-European Networks;”8 and
5. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION , Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992).
6. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J.
(C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
7. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE T REATY ON EUROPEAN U NION ,
THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE E UROPEAN C OMMUNITIES AND C ERTAIN
RELATED ACTS , Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF
AMSTERDAM ]. The Treaty of Amsterdam also contained changes of the TEU.
8. The text of Article 154 states:
1. To help achieve the objectives referred to in Articles 14 and 158
and to enable citizens of the Union, economic operators and regional
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and local communities to derive full benefit from the setting-up of an
area without internal frontiers, the Community shall contribute to
the establishment and development of trans-European networks in
the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures.
2. Within the framework of a system of open and competitive
markets, action by the Community shall aim at promoting the interconnection and interoperability of national networks as well as access to such networks. It shall take account in particular of the need
to link island, landlocked and peripheral regions with the central regions of the Community.
EC TREATY art. 154. Article 155 states:
In order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 154, the
Community:
-- shall establish a series of guidelines covering the objectives, priorities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the sphere of transEuropean networks; these guidelines shall identify projects of common interest;
-- shall implement any measures that may prove necessary to ensure the interoperability of the networks, in particular in the field of
technical standardisation;
-- may support projects of common interest supported by Member
States, which are identified in the framework of the guidelines referred to in the first indent, particularly through feasibility studies,
loan guarantees or interest-rate subsidies; the Community may also
contribute, through the Cohesion Fund set up pursuant to Article
161, to the financing of specific projects in Member States in the
area of transport infrastructure.
The Community’s activities shall take into account the potential
economic viability of the projects.
2. Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordinate among themselves the policies pursued at national level which
may have a significant impact on the achievement of the objectives
referred to in Article 154. The Commission may, in close cooperation
with the Member State, take any useful initiative to promote such
coordination.
3. The Community may decide to cooperate with third countries
to promote projects of mutual interest and to ensure the interoperability of networks .
Id. art. 155. Article 156 states:
The guidelines and other measures referred to in Article 155(1) shall
be adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure
referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
Guidelines and projects of common interest which relate to the territory of a Member State shall require the approval of the Member
State concerned.
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(2) Article 157 seconds these objectives on a more general
level.9
The main regulatory instruments, however, have been the
articles referring to: (1) liberalization — Article 86 (ex Article
90);10 (2) harmonization — Article 95 (ex Article 100a);11 and
Id. art. 156.
9. The text of Article 157 is:
1. The Community and the Member States shall ensure that the
conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Community’s industry exist.
For that purpose, in accordance with a system of open and competitive markets, their action shall be aimed at:
-- speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes;
-- encouraging an environment favourable to initiative and to the
development of undertakings throughout the Community, particularly small and medium-sized undertakings;
-- encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation between
undertakings;
-- fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development.
2. The Member States shall consult each other in liaison with the
Commission and, where necessary, shall coordinate their action.
The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote such coordination.
3. The Community shall contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in paragraph 1 through the policies and activities it
pursues under other provisions of this Treaty. The Council, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, after consulting
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee,
may decide on specific measures in support of action taken in the
Member States to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1.
This Title shall not provide a basis for the introduction by the
Community of any measure which could lead to a distortion of competition.
Id. art. 157.
10. Article 86 states:
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which
Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States
shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to
the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenueproducing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this
Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in
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fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of
trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to
the interests of the Community.
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions
of this Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.
Id. art. 86.
11. Article 95 states:
1. By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise
provided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 14. The Council
shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article
251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt
the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free movement of persons nor to those relating to the
rights and interests of employed persons.
3. The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1
concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer
protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific facts.
Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and the
Council will also seek to achieve this objective.
4. If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a
harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary to
maintain national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to
in Article 30, or relating to the protection of the environment or the
working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provisions as well as the grounds for maintaining them.
5. Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary to introduce national provisions based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of
the environment or the working environment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising after the adoption of the
harmonisation measure, it shall notify the Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them.
6. The Commission shall, within six months of the notifications as
referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, approve or reject the national provisions involved after having verified whether or not they are a
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade
between Member States and whether or not they shall constitute an
obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. In the absence of
a decision by the Commission within this period the national provisions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be deemed to have been
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(3) the arsenal of competition regulation — Articles 81-89 (ex
Articles 85 - 94).12
approved. When justified by the complexity of the matter and in the
absence of danger for human health, the Commission may notify the
Member State concerned that the period referred to in this paragraph may be extended for a further period of up to six months.
7. When, pursuant to paragraph 6, a Member State is authorised
to maintain or introduce national provisions derogating from a harmonisation measure, the Commission shall immediately examine
whether to propose an adaptation to that measure.
8. When a Member State raises a specific problem on public
health in a field which has been the subject of prior harmonisation
measures, it shall bring it to the attention of the Commission which
shall immediately examine whether to propose appropriate measures to the Council.
9. By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles
226 and 227, the Commission and any Member State may bring the
matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State is making improper use of the powers provided
for in this Article.
10. The harmonisation measures referred to above shall, in appropriate cases, include a safeguard clause authorising the Member
States to take, for one or more of the non-economic reasons referred
to in Article 30, provisional measures subject to a Community control procedure.
Id. art. 95.
12. Article 81 states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.
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3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
-- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers
a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
EC TREATY art. 81. Article 82 states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may
affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices
or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the
prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.
Id. art. 82. Article 83 states:
1. The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the
principles set out in Articles 81 and 82 shall be laid down by the
Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament.
2. The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall
be designed in particular:
(a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article
81(1) and in Article 82 by making provision for fines and periodic
penalty payments;
(b) to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 81(3),
taking into account the need to ensure effective supervision on the
one hand, and to simplify administration to the greatest possible extent on the other;
(c) to define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy,
the scope of the provisions of Articles 81 and 82;
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As stated above, the competition law instruments are me ntioned here for the sake of completeness. This Article will focus
on the use of the liberalization and harmonization instruments.
The main institutional agents involved in EU regulation and
policy making are the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. The Commission is the main initiator of regulation
and oversees the enforcement of the treaties. The Me mber
States of the EU are represented in the Council. Since 1979,
the Parliament is directly elected in the Member States according to their election rules. The Parliament has increasingly received co-decision power by the various changes to the treaties.
With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Parliament can now be regarded as co-legislator together with the Council.13 With the
appointment of the President of the Commission being subject
to Parliament’s approval, Parliament has also gained more
(d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the
Court of Justice in applying the provisions laid down in this paragraph;
(e) to determine the relationship between national laws and the
provisions contained in this Section or adopted pursuant to this Article.
Id. art. 83. Article 84 states:
Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance
of Article 83, the authorities in Member States shall rule on the admissibility of agreements, decisions and concerted practices and on
abuse of a dominant position in the common market in accordance
with the law of their country and with the provisions of Article 81, in
particular paragraph 3, and of Article 82.
Id. art. 84. Article 85 states:
1. Without prejudice to Article 84, the Commission shall ensure
the application of the principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82. On
application by a Member State or on its own initiative, and in cooperation with the competent authorities in the Member States, who
shall give it their assistance, the Commission shall investigate cases
of suspected infringement of these principles. If it finds that there
has been an infringement, it shall propose appropriate measures to
bring it to an end.
2. If the infringement is not brought to an end, the Commission
shall record such infringement of the principles in a reasoned decision. The Commission may publish its decision and authorise Member States to take the measures, the conditions and details of which
it shall determine, needed to remedy the situation.
Id. art. 85.
13. See T REATY OF AMSTERDAM , arts. J.11, K.17, 109q & 12o.
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weight in its relationship to the Commission.14 As we shall see,
this gradual shift of power has significant effects on the way
telecommunications regulation evolved.
B. The Regulatory Toolbox
Liberalization, harmonization and checks on competition describe the functional objectives of the instruments of Community law that are available to the EU institutions.
1. Liberalization
Liberalization measures have been based on EC Treaty Article 86 (ex Article 90). National telecommunications operators
were among those undertakings which had been granted special and exclusive rights in the general economic interest. For a
long time, their role was not questioned, although the EC
Treaty had made it clear that such undertakings could pose
competition problems in the EU market.15 However, Article 86
also confirmed that such undertakings enjoyed possibilities for
exemption if necessary to enable those undertakings to perform
the particular tasks assigned to them.16 But this exemption
itself was subject to an exemption: the Commission has to act
when and where necessary to ensure, by decisions and/or directives, that this exemption in turn is guided only by the requirements of the particular tasks assigned to the undertakings, or is based on particular aspects of general economic interest accepted in the context of the EC Treaty (like public
health and safety, which already permit exemption from the
free movement of goods and services), and that the exemption
does not disrupt trade to an extent that would be contrary to
the Community’s interests.17
14. For a concise description of these developments, see KLEMENS H.
FISCHER, T HE EUROPEAN UNION: A COMPACT G UIDE FOR BUSINESSGOVERNMENT-RELATIONS 62-63 (2001); Europarl, Fact Sheets, at
http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/default_en.htm (last visited Apr. 20,
2002) [hereinafter Fact Sheets].
15. See EC TREATY art. 86.
16. Such a derogation was explicitly given to voice telephony. See Commission Directive 90/388 of 28 June 1990 on Competition in the Markets for
Telecommunications Services, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 10 [hereinafter Commission
Directive 90/388].
17. See EC TREATY art. 86.
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When the Commission started to intervene on this legal basis
in the area of telecommunications, it immediately created a
source of conflict among EU institutions and with the Me mber
States. We will briefly look at these conflicts when we describe
the situation before the 1999 Communications Review. However, in preview of some of the final observations of this Article,
it may be observed that Commission policy gradually seems to
re-emphasize aspects of public interest and public service,
again not without consequences for telecommunications regulation.
2. Harmonization
“Harmonization” according to EC Treaty Article 95 (ex Article 100a) had been the trad itional good for everything method.
The Article allows for approximation of regulatory mechanisms
(not only laws) in the Member States as long as such approximation serves the EU market, unless other provisions are more
directly applicable. The harmonization effort, ho wever, has to
be the main thrust of the proposed measure.18
3. Competition
The traditional competition law instruments are general instruments of market (re)balance directed at undertakings.
Since the focus of this Article is the specific telecommunications law landscape created by the EU for the Member States,
these measures are described here only to complete the picture.
There are, however, overlaps: overlaps of competence between
general competition authorities and specific telecommunications regulatory autho rities and overlaps of definition for intervention thresholds. As we shall see, sector specific regulatory
activities in telecommunications have attempted to address
some of these problems. There are three instruments which the
Commission uses to ensure and maintain competition: (1) ac-

18. See Case C-187/93, Parliament v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-2857; Case C155/91, Commission v. Council, 1993 E.C.R. I-939. For further comments, see
PIERRE L AROUCHE , COMPETITION L AW AND REGULATION IN EUROPEAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 408 (2000).
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tion against concerted practices; (2) action against abuses of
dominant positions; and (3) investigations into mergers.19
In the context of telecommunications, the bases for actions
against concerted practices are EC Treaty Articles 3(g), 81, 83,
84 and 85 (ex Articles 85, 87, 88 and 89).20 These actions are
governed by the prohibition principle of Article 81(1) and (2)
which states that all agreements between undertakings (including associations and concerted practices) that may affect
trade between Member States are prohibited and void.21
Article 81(3) is an exemption to this principle and relates to
agreements which are deemed to have positive effects on the
economy, such as agreements that improve the production or
distribution of goods or promote technical or economic progress.
These agreements, however, have to show direct benefits for
the consumers as well, and they may not impose unnecessary
restrictions or aim to eliminate competition for a substantial
part of the products concerned.22
The Commission intervenes according to Council Regulation
17/62 of 6 February 1962 (based on EC Treaty Article 83) - with
various later amendments. The Commission finds infringements and may impose fines and penalty payments. Damages
to third parties may be granted, but only by national courts,
whereas penalties and fines may also be charged by national
competition authorities. The Commission may also grant what
is known as a “negative clearance,” i.e., provide a certificate to
an undertaking that its agreements are not in conflict with the
prohibition principle. In addition, the Commission may grant
individual exemptions. There is also the widely used possibility
of an “en bloc negative clearance” for certain typical agreements in specific areas.23
19. There are other measures – against state aid – used to ensure competition, however, they are not directly relevant here. See, e.g., EC TREATY arts.
87-89.
20. See Fact Sheets, supra note 14, at pt. 3, ch. 3.1.
21. EC TREATY art. 81(1)-(2).
22. Id. art. 81(3).
23. See, e.g., Council Regulation 19/65 of 2 March 1965 on Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1965-1966 O.J. S PEC. ED. 35; Council Regulation 2821/71 of
20 December 1971 on Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories
of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices, 1971 O.J. S PEC. ED. (L
285) 49; Council Regulation 1215/99 of 10 June 1999 Amending Regulation
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Even if there is an infringement, the Commission will not act
in cases of minor importance. This de minimis principle not
only reduces the workload, but also tends to favor small and
medium sized enterprises. The threshold for agreements which
fall under the scrutiny of the Commission is a market share of
10% for vertical agreements and 5% for horizo ntal agreements.
However, certain activities remain generally prohibited regardless of the de minimis rule: price fixing, joint sales offices, production or delivery quotas, sharing of markets or supply
sources in the area of horizontal agreements and fixing the resale price and absolute territorial protection clause as regards
vertical agreements. All these rules are currently under revision, independently of the changes in the telecommunications
regulation sector, aiming at a more flexible and a more decentralized system of competition control.24
Measures against abuse of a dominant position25 are based
on EC Treaty Article 82 (ex Article 86). Abuse of a domi nant
position occurs when the undertaking influences the structure
of the relevant market or its degree of competition (e.g., imposing unfair prices or unfair trading conditions; limiting production, markets or technical development to the detriment of consumers; etc.) throughout the EU market, or at least a substantial part of it.26 Criteria are the nature of the product, substitute products and consumers’ perception. Abuse of a dominant
position must adversely affect trade between Member States,
or be likely to do so.27 The Commission may decide to order a
stop to such abuse, may impose a fine or penalty, or, as the
case may be, may also issue a “negative clearance” at an undertaking’s request if it considers that the practice concerned does
not infringe EU law.28 This system is currently subject to reform as well.

19/65 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of
Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 148) 1.
24. See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the
Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and
Amending Regulations 1017/68, 2988/74, 4056/86 and 3975/87 (“Regulation
Implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty”), COM(00)582 final.
25. See Fact Sheets, supra note 14, at pt. 3, ch. 3.2.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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The rules on abuse of a dominant position imply merger control as a proactive risk control measure against the imminent
danger of an abuse of a dominant position.29 A merger occurs
when a firm acquires exclusive control of another firm or of a
firm it controlled jointly with another firm, or where several
firms take control of a firm or create a new one. The Commission has the power to examine mergers before they occur. The
Commission will analyze the ir compatibility with the European
market by looking at the impact on the relevant market. This
comprises: (1) defining the relevant product market; (2) defining the relevant geographic market; and (3) assessing the compatibility of the merger with the internal market on the basis
of the principle of a dominant position. The Commission looks
at cases if certain thresholds are reached.30
The main instruments of EU regulatory power are decisions,
directives and regulations:
(1) Decisions can be directed at other EU institutions, Members States or physical and legal persons;31
(2) Directives are addressed to Member States. Member
States have a time span set by the directive in which the objectives of the directive must be transformed into national law. In
theory, Member States have a certain measure of discretion to
use the appropriate means to achieve these objectives.32 Increasingly, however, directives have become more and more
29. See Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of
Concentrations between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1 [hereinafter
Council Regulation 4064/89]. It was subsequently amended by Council Regulation 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 Amending Regulation 4064/89 on the Control
of Concentrations between Undertakings, 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1, which took
effect on Mar. 1, 1998 [hereinafter Council Regulation 1310/97].
30. The companies concerned have a combined worldwide turnover of at
least ECU 5 billion; and at least two of the companies concerned have a
minimum Community-wide turnover of ECU 250 million. Each of the companies concerned generates no more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover in one Member State; or the companies have a combined worldwide turnover of more than ECU 2.5 billion and a turnover of
more than ECU 100 million in each of at least three Member States. Individually, for at least two of the companies concerned, a turnover of more than
ECU 25 million in each of the three Member States and more than ECU 100
million in the Community as a whole. See Council Regulation 1310/97, supra
note 29, art. 1.
31. EC TREATY art. 249.
32. Id.
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precise to counterbalance occasional reluctance in Member
States to transform directives appropriately. Directives or appropriate parts of the directives may become directly binding in
such Member States which have failed to transform the directive within the given time limit.33 In addition, the Commission
may start infringement procedures before the European Court
of Justice (“ECJ”).34 It should be kept in mind that whenever
reference is made to a directive, it does not effect change directly, but requires — as indicated by the term “directive” —
internal national transformation procedures which may or may
not always fully reflect the objectives of the directive; and
(3) Regulations are directly applicable in the Member States.
They directly become part of a Member State’s legal system
without any further national transformation act.35
Depending on the subject of regulation, EU institutions act
separately or in prescribed cooperative procedures. The typical
instrument of regulation in the telecommunications field is the
directive. Where such a directive aims at the harmonization of
the regulatory environment of telecommunications in the
Member States, the adequate procedure is the “co-decision procedure.”36 Such regulatory activity is initiated by the Commission. The proposal goes to the Council and to the First Reading
33. See, e.g., Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, 1982
E.C.R. 53 (holding that unconditional and precise provisions of a directive
trump national provisions that are incompatible with the directive).
34. See The Court of Justice of the European Communities, Court of Justice
and
Court
of
First
Instance:
Jurisdiction,
at
http://www.curia.eu.int/en/pres/comp.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter ECJ Website]. The ECJ consists of the Court of First Instance (“CFI”)
and the Court of Justice (“CJ”). The CJ decides – among other issues – on
disputes between Member States; and disputes between the EU and Member
States; disputes between EU institutions; and disputes between individuals
and the EU. Id. It provides opinions on international agreements and preliminary rulings, which help to ensure the uniform interpretation of Community law. Id. Preliminary rulings are provided in cases where a question of
law has been referred to the CJ by national courts, which have a case pending before them for which the answer to that legal question is decisive. Id.;
see also EC TREATY art. 234. The CFI is the court of first instance for (among
others) disputes between the Community institutions and staff, and for certain actions brought against the Commission by undertakings or associations
or individuals. ECJ Website, supra note 34. CFI judgments can be appealed
to the CJ only on points of law. EC TREATY art. 234.
35. EC TREATY art. 249.
36. Id. art. 251.
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in Parliament. Depending on the outcome, there will be
amendments from that First Reading, a “Common Position”
from the Council and an amended proposal, which then go to a
Second Reading of the Parliament and, if necessary, into conciliation procedure, or the proposal simply fails.37
III. THE REGULATORY STORY: BEFORE THE R EVIEW , THE
REVIEW AND AFTER THE REVIEW
The plot of the following story is very simple: the 1999 Communications Review38 is taken as the watershed for telecommunications regulation in Europe. Other historical moments
would offer the mselves as well, such as the full liberalization of
the European telecommunication markets on January 1,
1998. 39 Emphasizing the 1999 Communications Review also
implies the danger of overlooking the importance of other EU
documents which may have carried perhaps a hidden, but ne vertheless important meaning for the future course of telecommunications regulation. The author will, in the course of this
Article, argue the importance of both the Green Paper on the
Conve rgence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implication for Regulation —
Towards an Information Society (“Green Paper on Convergence”)40 and another paper which normally is not considered
in direct connection with European telecommunications regulation — the Communication on Services of General Interest in
Europe.41 It was the 1999 Communications Review, however,
37. Id.
38. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: Towards a New Framework for Electronic Communications Infrastructure and Associated Services: The 1999 Communications Review,
COM(99)539 final [hereinafter 1999 Communications Review].
39. This is true with the exception of Luxemburg, Spain, Ireland, Portugal
and Greece, which were granted longer transition periods. See EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, S TATUS REPORT ON
EUROPEAN UNION
ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 40 n.113 (1999), at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/ infosoc/telecompolicy/en/tcstatus.pdf.
40. Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media
and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation:
Towards an Information Society Approach, COM(97)623 final [hereinafter
Green Paper on Convergence].
41. Commission Communication on Services of General Interest in
Europe, 1996 O.J. (C 281) 3 [hereinafter Services of General Interest].
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which brought with it the new regulatory package and the design of the future regulatory landscape, and this is why we take
it as the turning point.
A. The State of Telecommunications Regulations Before the
1999 Communications Review
1. The Early Beginnings
EU telecommunications policy began in 1987 with the Green
Paper — Towards A Dynamic European Economy, Green Paper
On The Developme nt Of The Common Market For Telecommunications Services And Equipment (“1987 Green Paper”)42 —
although other authors refer to earlier yet failed beginnings.43
At that time, the public telecommunications operators (“PTOs”)
enjoyed national monopolies with regard to both infrastructure
and services. In most cases, these operators were owned by the
state and very often they were also integrated into the admi nistrative system of that state.44 Nevertheless, there was European cooperation. In 1959, the Western European countries
founded, outside the institutional framework of the EU, the
Conférence Européen des Administrations des Postes et des
Télécommunications (European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations) (“CEPT”) to assist in setting
standards for transborder electronic communications.45 At that
time, there had also been failed attempts, now found within the
framework of the EU, to open at least the internal procurement
markets of the telecommunications sector. Only in the United
Kingdom, after the rise of the Thatcher government, did British Telecom turn into an entity separate from the state (although still owned by it at least for a short while), and a competitive network operator, Mercury Communications, was allowed to enter the market.46
42. Towards a Dynamic European Economy, Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290 final [hereinafter The 1987 Green Paper].
43. See ELI NOAM , TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE 305-06 (1992).
44. LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 2.
45. Radiocommunications Agency, European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations, at http://www.radio.gov.uk/topics
/international/ceptintro.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
46. See NOAM , supra note 43, at 104.
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The U.K. had already been the testing ground for a Commission decision which contained all the drama and curious coalitions of power that were to mark the coming changes in telecommunications regulation in the EU. In 1982, a Commission
decision based on EC Treaty Article 82 (ex Article 86) intervened against British Telecom to stop the prevention of service
companies from forwarding high speed telefax messages between foreign countries using telephone lines.47 While British
Telecom, now in its new British environment, accepted that
decision, the Italian government did not, mainly as its PTO
was losing money because of the activities of those service companies. The Italian government brought the case before the
ECJ, arguing that the Commission had overstepped its competence.48 The British government also intervened, but on behalf
of the Commission to uphold the decision. The ECJ ruled in
favor of the Commission and made it clear that EU competition
law did apply to those public sector players which dominated
telecommunications in the Member States.49 This case also
showed the coming front lines between those Member States
who were open to change and sided with the Commission, and
the more reluctant Member States on the other side.
2. Forces at Play
Another frontline was soon to become visible in a different
conflict to be solved by the ECJ: the conflict between the Commission and the Council over legal instruments, where the
Commission had claimed it could use the liberalization article
to proceed and open the telecommunications market.50 This
instrument had no small advantage — the Commission could
use it alone without formal consent from the Council or the
Parliament.
The Parliament, so as not to forget the third institutional
player, took rather a liberal view on telecommunications regu47. See Günter Knieps, Regulatory Reform of European Telecommunications: Past Experience and Forward-looking Perspectives, Paper Presented at
Diskussionsbeiträge des Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik
(May
2001),
available
at
http://www.vwl.unifreiburg.de/fakultaet/vw/disk77.pdf.
48. Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 873.
49. Id.
50. See infra Part III.A.4.
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latory policy. As regards the discussion on the appropriate legal instruments, the Parliament sided with the Council’s approach due, perhaps, to a natural suspicion towards Commission activities. In substance, however, the Parliament had also
already started to worry about the social implications of liberalization.51 With increasing power, especially with the introduction of the “co-decision procedure” in the Maastricht Treaty
in 1993, Parliament became more outspoken on the issue of
public services and their importance for solidarity and social
integration in the EU, which did not remain without consequences for the regulatory policies in the telecommunications
sector.52
At that time, however, the fronts were not that clearly cut.
Mark Thatcher refers to a complex pattern of national players
and their telecommunications policies interwoven with other
activities on the level of the EU institutions.53 In all Member
States there was an understanding of the need for change and
that this change would fund amentally affect the future role of
PTOs, which in most cases themselves were already open to
change.54 The main question was timing and the control of timing, and there was the expectation of receiving gains, perhaps
in other areas, if one showed a willingness to change. Governments could still envisage their national PTOs playing an important macro-economic role in a liberalized environment while
cashing in on eventual privatization and harvesting the political benefits from an economy revitalized by a more competitive
telecommunications infrastructure and market. PTOs, particularly in top management, saw new opportunities to prove their
management skills which, in their opinion, had been reigned in
too much and for too long by national administrative thinking.55 The PTOs were looking for new sources of capital influx
in order to become global players. Even European trade un51. LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 43.
52. See THOMAS H ART, EUROPÄISCHE TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSPOLITIK :
ENTWÜRFE FÜR EIN Z UKUNFTSORIENTIERTES REGULIERUNGSKONZEPT 53 n.35
(1999); LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 43.
53. M ARK T HATCHER, T HE EUROPEANISATION OF REGULATION: T HE CASE OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (European Univ. Inst., Working Paper RSC No. 99/22,
1999), available at http://www.iue.it/RSC/WP-Texts/99_22t.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2002).
54. See id.
55. See id.
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ions, already in the process of fighting their own identity crises,
could prove the mselves reliable agents of change, while at the
same time seeking advantages for their members and their organizations before the inevitable settled in. And consumers, the
“end-end users,” did not feel affected as long as voice telephony
was not disturbed, and as long as they could get their standard
services a little faster than before.56
Furthermore, in all the national negotiations, reference could
be made to EU negotiations, Commission requirements and
Council outcomes, thus all the apparent “European necessities”
helped to accelerate transformation processes. This did not restrain Member States from also using the Council to slow down
such processes again if deemed necessary. At that time, what
was actually happening in the Council occurred behind a curtain of institutional secrecy with only limited access for the
general public.
3. Reasons for Change
The Commission never stopped displaying its intention to
speed up change. And the need for change was obvious: technological change had questioned the basis of natural monopolies.
Globalization (at that time known under the heading of “operations of international companies”)57 required international ne tworks and services, and so did national industries and world
trade in general. Even the individual end user, the consumer,
became increasingly dissatisfied with the level of services
available. In addition, since 1984, deregulation in the United
States had sent new powerful competitors into international
markets. Indeed, 1984 became the year which saw the
beginning by various attempts of the recently unbundled
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (“AT&T”) to take
a hold in the European market by founding, for example, AT&T
and Philips Telecommunications Besloten Vennootschap together with Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV (first attempts
of cooperation dating back to 1982), a venture which later became AT&T Network System International. AT&T bought a

56. See id.
57. See id.
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25% share of Olivetti.58 AT&T was also initiating negotiations
with Alcatel and began various other activities in Europe.59
Change was happening in the Commission as well. In 1983,
a task force for information technology and telecommunications
was formed. In 1984, the Senior Officials Group on Telecommunications was set up to give advice to the Commission.60
This group promptly proposed an action program.61 That same
year, the CEPT agreed to cooperate with the EU in the European Committees for Standardization and Electrotechnical
Standardization. The first recommendations on standardization in the telecommunication area were issued in that year as
well,62 followed by another recommendation on liberalizing the
terminal equipment market. The year 1985 was mainly dedicated to ge tting research activities off the ground.63 In 1986,
the Directorate-General XIII (Telecommunications, Information Industries, and Innovation) was created (today called “Information Society”). In 1987, the EU saw a wide range of directives and regulations which, however, did not yet fundame ntally affect the operations of the national PTOs.64 So while the
1987 Green Paper became the first clearly visible sign of
change for telecommunication regulation in the EU, it did not
necessarily come as a total surprise.
The main aim of the 1987 Green Paper was, in its own words,
“[to open up] the telecommunications sector without destroying
58. See ANNE -M ARIE DEALAUNAY M ACULAN, HISTOIRE COMPARÉE DE
S TRATÉGIES ET DÉVELOPPEMENT DES TÉLÉCOMMUNICATIONS 98 (1997).
59. Id.
60. See Communication from the Commission to the Council on Telecommunications: Progress Report on the Thinking and Work Done in the Field
and Initial Proposals for an Action Programme, COM(84)277 final.
61. See id.
62. See Council Recommendation 84/549 of 12 November 1984 Concerning
the Implementation of Harmonization in the Field of Telecommunications,
1984 O.J. (L 298) 49.
63. See Council Decision 87/372 of 25 July 1985 on a Definition Phase for
a Community Action in the Field of Telecommunications Technologies: R & D
Programme in Advanced Communications Technologies for Europe (RACE),
1985 O.J. (L 210) 24; Council Decision 88/28 of 14 December 1987 on a Community Programme in the Field of Telecommunications Technologies: Research and Development (R&D) in Advanced Communications Technologies
in Europe (RACE Programme), 1998 O.J. (L 16) 35.
64. For more details, see ECKART WIECHERT , EUROPÄISCHES TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSRECHT – E UTKR - R ECHTSVORSCHRIFTEN UND D OKUMENTE DER
EU; EINFÜHRUNGEN UND ERLÄUTERUNGEN 28 (1995).
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the organizational structures which maintain the integrity and
viability of the infrastructures, and which allow the operators
to carry out their public service functions.”65 However, this was
only part of the message. When addressing the solutions, the
1987 Green Paper did concede that the telecommunication administrations were essentially necessary in order to provide for
public service functions. But, at the same time, the Commission pointed out that it would become increasingly difficult to
draw a line between those services that could be reserved to
the PTOs and those which should be opened.66 And it added
that time was running short to get started for change. After
consultation on the 1987 Green Paper, the Commission published its plans for the next five years up to 1992,67 which were
then accepted by the Council in 1988.68
4. Regulatory Activities Before the 1999
Communications Review
Not all instruments available to start the regulatory game
were equal. Liberalization measures as provided by EC Treaty
Article 86 (ex Article 90) had the particular advantage already
mentioned above: they could be used by the Commission alone
— at least in theory.69 On the other hand, harmonization procedures, based on EC Treaty Article 95 (ex Article 100a), were
a matter essentially for the Council for final decision.70 Which
route to take for telecommunications? Following Yogi Berra’s
advice on what to do when one comes to a fork in the road, both
institutions went ahead with their ways. The Commission is-

65. The 1987 Green Paper, supra note 42, at 7. See also S TEPHAN
POLSTER, D AS TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSRECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT
8 (1999).
66. For further details, see LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 9.
67. See Communication from the Commission: Towards a Competitive
Community-wide; Telecommunications Market in 1992 Implementing the
Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(88)48 final.
68. See Council Resolution 88/C 257/01 of 30 June 1988 on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment up to 1992, 1988 O.J. (C 257) 1.
69. EC TREATY art. 86.
70. Id. art. 95.
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sued the “Terminal Equipment” directive in May 1988.71 While
there had been common basic agreement on the goals, some
Member States did challenge this kind of procedure which
threatened their control of timing. They challenged the directive in court. The same happened to the later Commission Directive 90/388 on Competition in the Markets for Telecommunications Services (“Services Directive”), although by then a
compromise on procedure with the Council had already been
found, but still not all Member States had been happy with the
consequences.72
This compromise (“Compromise of December 1989”)73 was
primarily a compromise on substance, the d etails of which have
now lost their importance with the progress of liberalization
and harmonization. But it was also a compromise on procedure
in so much as both institutions would carry on with their liberalization and harmonization procedures. The Commission
would use self-restraint and would go ahead with a liberalization d irective only if there were as many Member States behind
such an instrument as required if the same issue would have to
be adopted by the Council in a harmonization procedure, i.e., a
qualified majority of Member States.74 It is significant for the
transparency of policy-making in the EU, at least at the time,
that such information had to be deduced from a frugal press
bulletin of a Council meeting, since the record of such meetings
had not been publicly accessible.75
In its judgments on the challenged directives, the ECJ basically affirmed the Commission’s legal argument, but with a
71. Commission Directive 88/301 of 16 May 1988 on Competition in the
Markets in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, 1988 O.J. (L 131) 73.
This directive was subsequently updated by Commission Directive 94/46 of 13
October 1994 Amending Directive 88/301 and Directive 90/388 in Particular
with Regard to Satellite Communications, 1994 O.J. (L 268) 15 [hereinafter
Commission Directive 94/46].
72. Commission Directive 90/388, supra note 16.
73. For further discussion and sources see L AROUCHE , supra note 18, at 43.
74. See id. at 47.
75. The transparency situation, although still heavily criticized, has now
changed legally, as far as any visit to European Community websites can
show. See Parliament and Council Regulation 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001
Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission
Documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Regulation 1049/2001].
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slight twist.76 The court stated that the Commission could not
act against Member States directly, but it could set the
specification in general terms of obligations arising under EC
Treaty Article 86.77 It concluded furthermore that approaches
according to the liberalization rules and approaches according
to the harmonization rule of EC Treaty Article 95 (ex Article
100a) were not mutually exclusive — an argument the
contesting parties had used against each other.78 But even
more important was the confirmation from the ECJ that those
“special or exclusive rights” in Article 86, which had been taken
for granted for so long, could be subjected to liberalization
measures.
In any case, as far as procedures were concerned, the ECJ in
essence confirmed the Compromise of December 1989:79 the
Commission and the Council could go ahead in parallel with
liberalization and harmonization measures.80 These decisions
and the Compromise of December 1989 set the stage for the
regulatory activities to come, but it also bred inconsistencies
which would become apparent much later. Indeed, the next five
years saw a wide range of activities both in the area of liberalization and harmonization, however, not always in a sufficiently
harmonized manner.81
As indicated above, the main instrument to start liberalization had been the Commission’s Services Directive.82 This Di76. See Case 202/88, French Republic v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-1223
(against Commission Directive 88/301) [hereinafter Case 202/88]; Joined
Cases C-271, C-281 & C-289/90, Spain v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-5833
(against Commission Directive 90/388).
77. See Case 202/88, 1991 E.C.R. I-1223, ¶ 17.
78. See L AROUCHE , supra note 18, at 52.
79. See id. at 53.
80. See id.
81. JOACHIM
S CHERER,
DIE
ÜBERPRÜFUNG
DES
EUROPÄISCHEN
TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSRECHTS: REGULIERUNGSBEDARF UND O PTIONEN FÜR DAS
KÜNFTIGE RECHT DER ELEKTRONISCHEN K OMMUNIKATIONSINFRAST RUKTUR 7
(2000).
82. See Commission Directive 90/388, supra note 72. This directive is
referred to, somewhat emphatically, since it exempted voice telephony but
defined voice telephony rather narrowly, as “the very basis for . . . the introduction of the Internet in the European Union.” HERBERT UNGERER, USE OF
EC COMPETITION RULES IN THE LIBERALISATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S
TELECOMMUNICATIONS S ECTOR : ASSESSMENT OF P AST EXPERIENCE AND
CONCLUSIONS FOR USE IN OTHER U TILITY S ECTORS 4 (2001), at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_009_en.pdf.
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rective subsequently provided the basis for directives on: (1)
satellite services, for which exclusive rights were to be phased
out by the end of 1994;83 (2) cable networks, which had to be
opened to telecommunications services (with the exception of
voice telephony at that time) and allowed to interconnect with
telecommunication networks;84 and (3) mobile telephony, for
which separate networks could be installed and which could
then interconnect with third party networks.85 Total liberalization came with the “Full Competition” Commission Directive
96/19, 86 except for those countries which had been granted
transition periods.87 These transition periods have now e xpired.
The starting document for the harmonization activities was
Council Directive 90/387 on “Open Network Provisions”
(“ONP”), which set out the harmonized conditions for network
access.88 On that basis, further sector and issue specific directives followed, such as: (1) Council Directive 92/44 on “Leased
Lines;”89 (2) Parliament and Council Directive 97/13 (“Licensing Directive”), which harmonized procedural questions; 90 (3)
83. See Commission Directive 94/46, supra note 71, arts. 1, 2 & 4.
84. See Commission Directive 95/51 of 18 October 1995 Amending Directive 90/388 with Regard to the Abolition of the Restrictions on the Use of
Cable Television Networks for the Provision of Already Liberalized Telecommunications Services, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 256) 49, 54.
85. See Commission Directive 96/2 of 16 January 1996 Amending Directive 90/388 with Regard to Mobile and Personal Communications, art. 1, 1996
O.J. (L 20) 59, 65.
86. See Commission Directive 96/19 of 13 March 1996 Amending Directive
90/388 with Regard to the Implementation of Full Competition in Telecommunications Markets, 1996 O.J. (L 74) 13.
87. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
88. Council Directive 90/387 of 28 June 1990 on the Establishment of the
Internal Market for Telecommunications Services Through the Implementation of Open Network Provision, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 1.
89. Council Directive 92/44 of 5 June 1992 on the Application of Open
Network Provision to Leased Lines, 1992 O.J. (L 165) 27. This directive was
later amended by Parliament and Council Directive 97/51 of 6 October 1997
Amending Council Directives 90/387 and 92/44 for the Purpose of Adaptation
to a Competitive Environment in Telecommunications, 1997 O.J. (L 295) 23
[hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 97/51]; and Commission Decision 98/80 of 7 January 1998 on Amendment of Annex II to Directive 92/44,
1998 O.J. (L 14) 27.
90. Parliament and Council Directive 97/13 of 10 April 1997 on a Common
Framework for General Authorizations and Individual Licenses in the Field
of Telecommunications Services, 1997 O.J. (L 117) 15 [hereinafter Parliament
and Council Directive 97/13].
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Parliament and Council Directive 97/33 on “Interconnection,”
which also contained the first rules on EU wide universal services; 91 and (4) Parliament and Council Directive 98/10 on
“Voice Telephony,” which again also contained further regulations on universal service (collectively the “ONP Directives”). 92
5. Evaluation
In all, these packages did not necessarily provide a transparent and clearly structured regulatory environment. Liberalization and harmonization directives could not avoid occasionally
addressing the same subject, nor was the terminology always
consistent. Consequently, the new design for the regulatory
environment became an important part of the Commission’s
suggestions in the 1999 Communications Review.93
Throughout this “first phase”94 (and up to this day) the Commission kept evaluating progress at regular intervals in its
reports on the Implementation of the Telecommunications
91. Parliament and Council Directive 97/33 of 30 June 1997 on Interconnection in Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring Universal Service
and Interoperability Through Application of the Principles of Open Network
Provision (ONP), 1997 O.J. (L 199) 32 [hereinafter Parliament and Council
Directive 97/33]. It was later amended by Parliament and Council Directive
98/61 of 24 September 1998 Amending Directive 97/33 with Regard to Operator Number Portability and Carrier Pre-selection, 1998 O.J. (L 268) 37.
92. Parliament and Council Directive 98/10 of 26 February 1998 on the
Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony and on
Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment,
1998 O.J. (L 101) 24 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 98/10].
93. See 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38.
94. LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at ch. 1. Larouche identifies four phases or
“regulatory models.” Id. at 1. The first model running, in Larouche’s opinion,
until 1990, and followed by the “regulatory model of the 1987 Green Paper”
until 1996. Id. at 1-3. The time between 1996 and 1997 is termed the “transitional model” initiated by the 1992 Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications Services Sector, SEC(92)1048 final; Communication from the
Commission, Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks: Part One: Principle and Timetable, COM(94)440 final; and Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecommunications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks: Part II: A Common Approach to the Provision of Infrastructure for Telecommunications in
the European Union, COM(94)682 final. The fourth phase, the “fully liberalized model” started in 1998. LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 22. Since this Article focuses on the year 1999 and after, the author has taken the liberty of
providing a more compressed time model.
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Regulatory Package.95 Obviously, in these reports, impleme ntation in the Member States played the main role. Up to the
fifth report — the situation shortly before the 1999 Communications Review — this situation was still far from optimal. By
that time the Commission had started about ninety infringement procedures against Member States because they were not
in conformity with the directives, particularly in the areas of
authorization and interconnection.96 Authorizations were very
often found not to be in conformity with the conditions set by
the Commission. Moreover, procedures were found to be overly
time consuming, lacking transparency or were simply too complicated or too expensive (not reflecting, it seemed, the costs of
administration as prescribed in the Licensing Directive). Incumbents proved to be reluctant in many cases to provide sufficient standard interconnection offers. National regulatory authorities (“NRAs”) were lacking stamina or sufficient legal
competence. Accounting principles established in the various
sector specific ONP Directives had not been sufficiently implemented in many Member States.
But the basic figures looked fairly bright. Prices for regional
and long distance calls had gone down, whereas prices for local
95. Reports are being periodically published by the Commission regarding
the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package: (1)
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package,
COM(97)236 final; (2) Communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions on the Implementation of the Telecommunications
Regulatory Package: First Update, COM(97)504 final; (3) Communication
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Third Report on the
Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(98)80
final; (4) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: Fourth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications
Regulatory Package, COM(98)594 final; (5) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Fifth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(99)537 final;
and (6) Sixth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(00)814 final [hereinafter Sixth Report].
96. See S CHERER, supra note 81, at 13. In July 2001, there were still about
sixty-five cases pending. Id.
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calls seemed to have risen only moderately. By November 1999,
in all Member States there were roughly 250 providers of long
distance calls, more than 220 local call providers, about 180
national and international network providers and almost 400
local network service providers. But, of course, there still were
problems, and the 1999 Communications Review was designed
to address them, and more.
And politically? The political aim of the Commission — and
the Commission did have political aims — was basically
reached by solving the “service of a general economic interest”
problem, the only area that could have generated potential political resistance. The Member States had either reluctantly or
willingly given up on the idea of the usefulness of a nationally
privileged PTO, even for the purpose of such a public (universal) service. This service would have to be organized differently, and it might as well still end up with the incumbents.
But politically the Member States by now were convinced, as
seen in the words of a European official at that time:
[T]he full effect of EU competition law in this respect could
only be achieved by carefully correlating the measures with
the development of the general regulatory framework and the
build-up of a national “regulatory infrastructure” [with the
help of the ONP Directives]. The approach was based on the
conviction that the objectives at EU level of liberalising sectors must be internalised into the Member States political
and regulatory structures to create the necessary base and
the “political mass” required for major liberalisation exercises.
The very basis of action in the telecommunications sector
was that the Commission recognised the objective of universal
service in the sector, but that it strongly emphasised proportionality of measures to secure this goal. It generated, by
broad consultation exercises, the general conviction that this
task could be secured by less restrictive means than retention
of monopoly rights, e.g. by financial contributions or the creation of universal service funds. The telecommunications sector
is now seen as the best demonstration in the Community that
the goals of competition and public service can therefore be
complementary and mutually reinforcing. 97

The future will tell what remains of this confidence.
97. UNGERER, supra note 82, at 7.
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B. The 1999 Communications Review
1. The Mandate
The various ONP Directives had included reference to a ne cessary review of telecommunication regulation in view of market developments.98 The review was preceded by a number of
studies from external experts. The results of the studies were
incorporated in the 1999 Communications Review. The term
“Review” in this context is, of course, perhaps slightly misleading since the main thrust of this exercise was to argue for and
to initiate change. Indeed, this communication not only announced but effected change, or is still in the process of doing
so.
2. The Main Elements of the 1999 Communications Review
The starting point of the 1999 Communications Review is the
changing market, or rather market and technology changes.
The 1999 Communications Review states:
Technological and market change in the communications sector is proceeding at an ever-increasing pace. . . . The Internet
is to a large extent overturning traditional market structures,
providing a common platform for the delivery of a wide range
of services. . . . Wireless applications are increasingly important in all segments of the market. . . . Finally, the development of technologies within the media sector, in particular
digital television (DTV) is providing transactional “on demand” services and new services such as data, Internet and
E-commerce, characterised both by services on digital terrestrial (DTTV) networks in many Member States, and a wave of
satellite and cable TV digital platforms. 99

The impact of these changes is not clearly foreseeable. Based
on this dilemma, the Commission goes on with a rhetorical balancing act: these markets should be left to develop, but they
should also be helped by stimulation, then these markets
98. See Parliament and Council Directive 97/51, supra note 89, art. 1
(amended art. 8 of the Council Directive 90/387); id. art. 2 (amended art. 14 of
the Council Directive 92/44); Parliament and Council Directive 98/10, supra
note 92, art. 31; Parliament and Council Directive 97/33, supra note 91, art.
23(2); Parliament and Council Directive 97/13, supra note 90, art. 23. See
also S CHERER, supra note 81, at 15.
99. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at iii-iv.
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should be sustained, but, of course, public and consumer interests should also be protected in these markets. It seems
worthwhile to reread this balancing act in the Commission’s
very own words:
How all the above trends [market and technology changes]
will shape the market over the next decade cannot be forecast
precisely. Regulators and market players alike face uncertainty as they look towards the future convergent environment. Regulators will need to have very clear objectives, including those of public interest, and a set of general-purpose
regulatory “tools” if they are to succeed in stimulating and
sustaining a market that remains vigorously competitive and
meets users’ needs, while at the same time protecting consumers’ rights. 100

Judging from these observations, regulation is seen as essentially a management issue, i.e., reaching an optimum created
from conflicting goals by balancing conflicting interests. In the
1999 Communications Review environment, this management
task is no longer primarily to manage the transition to competition by mainly helping new entrants — it is now about managing competition itself.
The 1999 Communications Review does not necessarily imply
a change of policy objectives, although one could argue that
consumer interests seem to have a stronger political weight
now than in previous policy papers. Rather — and this seems
to coincide with a general change of the political climate in the
EU and Member States — there is perceivably less enthusiasm
for EU institutions and almost consequently, the 1999 Communications Review seems to propagate a phase of regulatory
minimalism. We shall return later to this phenomenon.
Then again, this regulatory minimalism runs into its own
conflicting objectives: regulatory stability, yes, but in face of
the dynamics of the market; technological ne utrality, yes, but
all equal services should be treated equally. Finally, there is
another example of elegant “European regulatory speak”: “future regulation should: . . . be enforced as closely as practicable
to the activities being regulated, whether regulation has been
agreed globally, regionally or nationally.”101
100. Id. at iv.
101. Id. at v.
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How does the new philosophy of regulatory minimalism
translate into the old environment of EU regulation? The 1999
Communications Review suggests a two-tiered approach: (1)
binding measures would be complemented by non-binding
measures, or rather, the importance of non-binding measures
would be made more visible; and (2) the range of the binding
measures would be curtailed drastically. The 1999 Communications Review sees the new regulatory order like this:
(1) Binding Measures: (a) a framework directive for the
general and specific policy objectives; (b) four specific directives (on licensing, access and interconnection, universal service, privacy and data protection); and (c) the continuing task
of competition law with an intention to substitute sector specific regulation by general competition law;102 and
(2) Non-Binding Measures: recommend ations, guidelines,
codes of conduct and other non-binding instruments to respond
to market developments.103
The very near future, however, would show how insufficient
non-binding measures could turn out to be. The “local loop”
problem was waiting to show its persistence. It was not that
the Commission had not already seen the local loop problem
looming in the background. The 1999 Communications Review
in fact had stated: “Urgent action is required to increase competition in the local loop.”104 But the Commission was a bit too
hopeful with regard to the efficiency of non-binding measures
and a bit too confident that competition tools would be sufficient. Nevertheless, it is interesting to read how the necessity
of binding regulations leads (at least in a first step) to a need
for “recommendations”:
National regulators in many Member States are introducing
requirements for incumbents to unbundle their local access
networks for use by competing service providers. The Commission welcomes this trend and considers that Community
action cannot wait for legislation to be adopted in this area.
Instead, the Commission will use Recommendations and, in
specific cases, its powers under the competition rules of the

102. Id. at v-vi, 16.
103. Id. at 18.
104. Id.
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Treaty to encourage local loop unbundling throughout the
EU.105

Whereas the regulatory approach adopted the minimal perspective, the general concept and outlook of the Commission
had by now broadened: the 1999 Communications Review
shows the Commission’s intent to address the electronic communication infrastructure of the EU as such, allowing exceptions only for content related rules. In short, the Commission
was ready not only to make telecommunications regulation
“lighter” but also to take on convergence.
This perspective had been prepared by the above me ntioned
Green Paper on Convergence in 1997.106 It had been open for
consultation processes which were summarized in a working
document. The working document had invited a second round
of consultations asking for input on “access to networks and
digital gateways in a converging environment, creating the
framework for investment, innovation, and encouraging European content production, distribution and availability, and ensuring a balanced approach to regulation.”107 The results of
that second round had become part of yet another communication,108 which was then integrated into the 1999 Communications Review.109
105. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at ix.
106. See Green Paper on Convergence, supra note 40. As Scherer points
out, the change is also the result of subtle changes resulting from innerinstitutional competition between the now called “Education and Culture”
General Directorate, formerly called “Information, Communication, Culture
and Audio-Visual Media,” and the “Information Society” General Directorate,
formerly called “Telecommunications, Information Market and Exploitation
of Research, Information Industry and Market and Language Processing.”
S CHERER, supra note 81, at 18 n.52
107. Working Document of the Commission: Summary of the Results of the
Public Consultation on the Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors; Areas For Further
Reflection, SEC(98)1284, available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/convergencegp/workdoc/1284en.pdf.
108. See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions: The Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation: Results of
the Public Consultation on the Green Paper [COM(97)623], COM(99)108
final.
109. See S CHERER, supra note 81, at 19.
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Furthermore, the 1999 Communications Review took in the
results from the consultations on the Green Paper on Radio
Spectrum Policy110 and conclusions from the Report on the Development of the Market for Digital Television in Europe.111 In
the 1999 Communications Review, the Commission thus
marked the beginning of at least the intention to develop a
comprehensive “electronic communications policy” rather than
a merely reformed continuation of “telecommunications policy.”
As regards the regulatory consequences of convergence, the
1999 Communications Review again gives a slightly confusing
impression. The Commission affirms that a single regulatory
framework for communications infrastructure and associated
services is advisable and will be the objective for further regulation.112 Technical convergence, however, does not necessarily
lead to regulatory convergence. There may be different public
sector interests in different converging areas which require
different treatment.113 The Commission cannot deny the existence of a highly differentiated system of regulations in the
Member States which seek to meet the different public interest
issues in the different areas of communications services and
which have led to separation into:
(1) telecommunications services or, in the new terminology
of the working papers accompanying the 1999 Communications
Review, “communication service” defined as:
[S]ervices provided for remuneration which consist wholly or
mainly in the transmission and routing of signals on electronic communications networks; it covers inter alia telecommunications services and transmission services in networks
used for broadcasting. It does not cover services such as the

110. See Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy in the Context of European
Community Policies such as Telecommunications, Broadcasting, Transport,
and R&D, COM(98)596 final [hereinafter Green Paper on Radio Spectrum
Policy].
111. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: The Development of the Market for Digital Television in the European Union: Report in the Context of Directive 95/47 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Use of Standards for the
Transmission of Television Signals, COM(99)540 final.
112. See 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at vi.
113. Id. at 5.
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content of broadcasting transmissions, delivered using electronic communications networks and services.114

(2) electronic mass communication services (e.g., radio and
television); and
(3) “Information Society” services, defined rather elaborately, for example, in Council Directive 2000/31 (“Electronic
Commerce Directive”) as:115
[A]ny service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing
(including digital compression) and storage of data, and at the
individual request of a recipient of a service; those services . .
. which do not imply data processing and storage are not covered by this definition. Information society services span a
wide range of ec onomic activities which take place on-line;
these activities can, in particular, consist of selling goods online; activities such as the delivery of goods as such or the
provision of services off-line are not covered; information society services are not solely restricted to services giving rise to
on-line contracting but also, in so far as they repr esent an
economic activity, extend to services which are not remunerated by those who receive them, such as those offering on-line
information or commercial communications, or those providing tools allowing for search, access and retrieval of data; information society services also include services consisting of
the transmission of information via a communication network, in providing access to a communication network or in
hosting information provided by a recipient of the service;
television broadcasting within the meaning of Directive
EEC/89/552 and radio broadcasting are not information society services because they are not provided at individual request; by contrast, services which are transmitted point to
114. Communication from the Commission: The Results of the Public Consultation on the 1999 Communications Review and Orientation for the New
Regulatory Framework, COM(00)239 final [hereinafter Results of the Public
Consultation].
115. Earlier definitions can be found in Parliament and Council Directive
98/34 of 22 June 1998 Laying Down a Procedure for the Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations, 1998 O.J. (L 204)
37. The directive was later amended by Parliament and Council Directive
98/48 of 20 July 1998 Amending Directive 98/34 Laying Down a Procedure for
the Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations, 1998 O.J. (L 217) 18; and Parliament and Council Directive 98/84 of 20
November 1998 on the Legal Protection of Services Based on, or Consisting
of, Conditional Access, 1998 O.J. (L 320) 54.
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point, such as video-on-demand or the provision of commercial
communications by electronic mail are information society
services; the use of electronic mail or equivalent individual
communications for instance by natural persons acting outside their trade, business or profession including their use for
the conclusion of contracts between such persons is not an information society service; the contractual relationship between an employee and his employer is not an information society service; activities which by their very nature cannot be
carried out at a distance and by electronic means, such as the
statutory auditing of company accounts or medical advice requiring the physical examination of a patient are not information society services.116

Consequently, the Commission states in the 1999 Communications Review that: “These rules would of course be without
prejudice to regulatory obligations (whether at EU or national
level) which apply to the content of broadcasting services or
other information society services.”117 Thus, the 1999 Communications Review leaves untouched the system of division between contents, conduit and transaction services, but at the
same time the Commission seeks to introduce its own concept.118 The Commission first sets aside services provided over
116. Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000 on Certain
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), ¶¶ 17-18,
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 3-4 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive
2000/31].
117. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at vi.
118. The activities in the area of Internet content, based on the Council
Recommendation 98/560 of 24 September 1998 on the Development of the
Competitiveness of the European Audiovisual and Information Services Industry by Promoting National Frameworks Aimed at Achieving a Comparable and Effective Level of Protection of Minors and Human Dignity, 1998 O.J.
(L 270) 48; and resulted in Parliament and Council Decision Adopting a
Multi-annual Community Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the Internet
by Combating Illegal and Harmful Content on Global Networks, 1999 O.J. (L
33) 1, are not aimed at regulation but are encouraging self-regulatory activities and user empowerment.
Contents regulations or at least content related regulations in the
Council Directive 89/552 of 3 October 1989 on the Coordination of Certain
Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989
O.J. (L 298) 23, relate to the services aspects of broadcasting. The directive is
later amended by Parliament and Council Directive 97/36 of 30 June 1997
Amending Directive 89/552 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid
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networks, e.g., broadcasting services and electronic banking.
This is an area to be regulated, as the case may be, by national
law or by specific measures of EU law, like the Electronic
Commerce Directive already quoted or Council Directive
97/36. 119 According to the 1999 Communications Review, the
remaining traditional “conduit” part then has two sub-parts: (1)
“Associated Services” are communications services like the traditional telecommunications services, following the definition
given above, and conditional access services; and (2) “Communications infrastructure” are communications networks and
associated facilities like cable television networks and application program interfaces (“APIs”).120
But even with this model, the 1999 Communications Review
cannot avoid (and even implicitly points to) a dilemma that it
cannot sufficiently resolve itself. There are issues which link at
least content and conduit almost inseparably, and these issues
occur whe never one has to weigh property interests of owners
of scarce or at least limited transport resources (frequencies)
against public interests. This weighing of interests produces
“must carry” rules which the Commi ssion has to address.121
And these rules show the limitations of such a separating approach. So, although the 1999 Communications Review started
out with a broad perspective on convergent infrastructures, it
is stuck with the need to carry on with regulatory differentiation.
The minimalism philosophy, the broadened but somewhat
double-bound view on convergence and the practical experiences with the past regulatory arrangements lead the Commission to give specifics in its new regulatory program. As regards
the binding measures and the new framework directive, the
Commission suggests that such a directive should:
[1] [I]dentify specific policy objectives for Member States. . .
[2] guarantee specific consumers’ rights (e.g. dispute resolution procedures, emergency call numbers, access to information, etc.);
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1997 O.J. (L 202)
60 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 97/36].
119. Parliament and Council Directive 97/36, supra note 118.
120. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at vii fig.
121. See id. at 30; S CHERER, supra note 81, at 21.

4/24/02 6:44:28 PM

776

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. XXVII:3

[3] ensure an appropriate level of interoperability for com munications services and equipment;
[4] set out the rights, responsibilities, decision making powers and procedures of NRAs (e.g. criteria for implementation
of flexibility clauses, forbearance), including possibilities for
appeal at national level and obligations to exclude arrangements that are contrary to Community competition law. 122

The four specific directives would comprise the following:
[1] Directive on authorisations and licensing, (based on the
Licensing Directive including rules for effective management
of, and access to, scarce resources);
[2] Directive on the provision of universal service,
incorporating elements of the current Voice Telephony
Directive, and Interconnection Directive;
[3] Directive on access and interconnection (based on the
current Interconnection Directive and the TV standards Directive); [and]
[4] Directive on data protection and privacy in the telecommunications sector (based on the Telecoms Data Protection Directive, updated and clarified to take account of technological developments). 123

The 1999 Communications Review did provide some further
information on how such regulation would look in more detail.
We will revisit the themes below when analyzing the current
situation. In the area of non-binding instruments, the Commission remained very “flexible”:
Complementary measures include guidelines and recommendations developed by the Commission or national authorities.
Where appropriate, codes of conduct, co-regulation agreements, recommendations, standards, memoranda of understanding, redress procedures, and other similar measures
could be drawn up in parallel with the aim of achieving harmonised solutions to common problems. Such measures can
be more easily and quickly agreed or adapted than legislation
and — where they are agreed by consensus of interested parties and backed up by effective sanctions in cases of noncompliance — can be very effective. . . . They provide a flexible tool for regulators, and will allow for regulation that is re-

122. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at 15.
123. Id.
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sponsive to the changing needs of the communications services market. 124

There was another, this time outspoken, question in the air
at least since the Green Paper on Convergence: would there be
or should there be a European regulatory authority (“ERA”)?125
However, based on external advice126 and institutional insight
in view of the responses to public consultation, the Commission
refrained from proposing such an authority. This does not imply that the then institutional structure of regulation was considered satisfactory: since the beginning of deregulation, Me mber States had separated the regulatory activities of their administration from their operational functions.127 There had
been manifold information and notification duties of NRAs to
the Commission, and there had already been dispute resolution.128 In addition, EU regulations had created several new
bodies and committees, with different purposes and procedures
on the Community level.129
It was thus tempting to cut through these organizations and
create an ERA. The Commission’s concession not to pursue this
idea any longer came with a price for the NRAs. The Commission suggested in the 1999 Review:
Since the rules at EU level will be more general than at
present, there will be a need for mechanisms to ensure that
NRAs apply the objectives and principles set out in the directives in a way which safeguards the integrity of the internal
market.
....

124. Id. at 18.
125. See S CHERER, supra note 81, at 80. For general information on the
problem of such an authority within the context of EU law in contrast to U.S.
law, see Xénophon A. Yataganas, Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the
European Union: The Relevance of the American Model of Independent
Agencies,
Harvard
Jean
Monnet
Working
Paper
No.
03/01,
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers.01/010301.rtf 2001.
126. See EUROSTRATEGIES/C ULLEN INT’L , FINAL REPORT ON THE P OSSIBLE
ADDED
V ALUE
OF
EUROPEAN
REGUL ATORY
AUTHORITY
FOR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/
telecompolicy/en/erastudy.pdf.
127. See S CHERER, supra note 81, at 79.
128. See Parliament and Council Directive 98/10, supra note 92, art. 26.
129. For more details, see S CHERER, supra note 81, at 80.
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The Commission continues to have a number of concerns
with regard to the effectiveness of some of these arrangements, and will strengthen existing legal provisions to ensure
that:
- the independent national regulator can undertake its role
of supervision of the market free from political interference,
without prejudice to the government’s responsibility for national policy;
- allocation of NRA responsibilities to different bodies does
not lead to delays and duplication of decision making;
- where sector-specific regulators and national com petition
authorities are both involved in issues related to communications infrastructure and associated services, there is effective
co-operation between the two bodies and that NRAs ensure
that their decisions are compatible with Community competition law;
- the decision -making procedures at national level are
transparent.
....
The Commission recognises the need for a clear regulatory
function to be exercised at the level of the Union . . . . The
Commission pr oposes to:
-replace the existing two telecommunications committees
with a new Communications Committee, drawing on the expertise of a new High Level Communications Group involving
the Commission and NRAs to help improve the consistent application of Community legislation;
-review existing legal provisions with a view to (i) strengthening the independence of NRAs, (ii) ensuring that the alloc ation of responsibilities between institutions at national level
does not lead to delays and duplications of decision making
(iii) improving cooperation between sector specific and general
competition authorities and (iv) requiring transparency of decision making procedures at a national level. 130

How much coordination and information this would mean for
NRAs would soon be shown in the new regulatory package,
when the ideas as to institutional balances in the new regulatory framework would take shape. Again, this is an issue worth
revisiting later for a more general analysis.

130. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at 53.
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C. Consequences of the 1999 Communications Review: The New
Regulatory Package
1. The New Regulatory Package and its Progress
The 1999 Communications Review contained a number of
specific proposals for: (1) licensing and authorizations; (2) access and interconnection; (3) universal service; (4) competition
in the local loop; and (5) consistent regulatory action at the EU
level.131 The 1999 Communications Review proposals initiated
the usual consultation process, which lasted until Fe bruary
131. Id. at 55. The 1999 Communications Review also contained observations on the radio spectrum policies. The main purposes of regulatory activities in this area have been transparency and coordination, allowing discussion of radio spectrum issues at Community level where Community interests
and policies are concerned, and ensuring a (partial) mandate to defend Community interests in international negotiations. Id. at 55-57.
This approach has so far been dealt with in the following documents:
Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, supra note 110; Parliament Resolution A4-0202/99 on the Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy in
the Context of European Community Policies such as Telecommunications,
Broadcasting, Transport, and R&D (COM(98)0596 – C4-0066/99), 1999 O.J.
(C 279) 72; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions: Next Steps in Radio Spectrum Policy: Results of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper, COM(99)538 final; and Parliament Resolution
A5-0122/2000 on the Commission Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions on “Next Steps in Radio Spectrum Policy - Results of the Public
Consultation on the Green Paper” (COM(99)538 – C5-0113/2000 –
2000/2073(COS)), 2001 O.J. (C 59) 245.
Further documents include: Communication from the Commission to
the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: Results of the World Radiocommunications Conference 2000 (WRC-2000) in the Context of Radio Spectrum Policy
in the European Community, COM(00)811 final; Proposal for a Decision of
the European Parliament and of the Council on a Regulatory Framework for
Radio Spectrum Policy in the European Community, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 256
[hereinafter Radio Spectrum Policy Proposal]. This proposal was discussed in
the Council (of Telecommunications Ministers) on June 27, 2001 and has
received its First Reading in the European Parliament on July 5, 2001. See
also Report on the Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of
the Council on a Regulatory Framework for Radio Spectrum Policy in the
European
Community,
A5-0232/2001
final,
at
http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/OM-Europarl?PROG=REPORT&L=
EN&PUBREF=//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-0232+0+DOC+PDF+
V0//EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=S (last visited May 1, 2002).
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2000. In April 2000, the result of this consultation process was
made public in a communication to the Parliament and the
Council.132
In July 2000, the Commission adopted several proposals
which formed the new regulatory package: (1) a proposal for a
directive on the new regulatory framework;133 (2) a proposal for
a directive on access and interconnection;134 (3) a proposal for a
directive on authorizations;135 (4) a proposal for a directive on
universal service and users’ rights;136 (5) a proposal for a directive on data protection;137 (6) measures as regards the local loop
problem; and (7) a Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and the Council on a Regulatory Framework for Radio
Spectrum Policy in the European Community.138
The five directive proposals were of the “harmonization” type
based on EC Treaty Article 95, to be adopted in a co-decision
procedure by the Council and the Parliament.139 In March
2001, these proposals were supplemented by a notice from the
Commission on the proposal of a “liberalization” directive based
on EC Treaty Article 86 for which the Commission is solely responsible (within the limits of the Compromise of December
132. See Results of the Public Consultation, supra note 114.
133. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications
Networks and Services, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 198 [hereinafter Framework
Proposal].
134. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications
Networks and Associated Facilities, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 215.
135. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and
Services, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 230.
136. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 238 [hereinafter
Universal Service Proposal].
137. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 223
[hereinafter Data Protection Proposal]; Parliament and Council Directive
97/66 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (L 24) 1 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 97/66].
138. See Radio Spectrum Policy Proposal, supra note 131.
139. EC TREATY art. 95.
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1989) and which will consolidate the Services Directive of 1990
as modified in 1996 and 1999. 140
As regards measures for competition in the local loop, the
Commission was immediately going ahead, taking the usual
steps but taking them unusually fast, first by directly issuing
— in parallel to the communication on the general results of
the post-1999 Communications Review consultation process —
a communication and a proposal for a recommendation,141 then
a month later the recommendation.142 In the end, the recommendation proved to be insufficient: a regulation was needed,
and a proposal for a regulation concerning the local loop became part of the regulatory package of July 2000.143 Although
the proposal for the local loop regulation received several
amendments in the Council and the Parliament,144 it became
the first and so far only proposal of that package that was
turned into a legally binding instrument, entering into force in
the beginning of 2001.145
So, from the various options available to address the local
loop issue,146 the Commission had given up the recommendation approach and had made true its 1999 Communications
Review warning by now directly prescribing a standard offer
for unbundled access, strictly cost-based and to be supervised
by the NRAs. This fast-track approach was also another, and

140. See Notice by the Commission Concerning a Draft Directive on Competition in the Markets for Electronic Communications Services, 2001 O.J. (C
96) 2.
141. See Communication from the Commission: Unbundled Access to the
Local Loop: Enabling the Competitive Provision of a Full Range of Electronic
Communication Services Including Broadband Multimedia and High-Speed
Internet, COM(00)237 final.
142. See Commission Recommendation of 25 May 2000 on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop: Enabling the Competitive Provision of a Full Range of
Electronic Communications Services Including Broadband Multimedia and
High-Speed Internet, 2000 O.J. (L 156) 44.
143. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 212.
144. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the
Council on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, COM(00)394 final; Amended
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, 2001 O.J. (C 62 E) 314.
145. See Parliament and Council Regulation 2887/2000, supra note 1.
146. For more detail, see LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 324.
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this time more direct answer to the question whether telecom
law was still needed in addition to competition law.
The whole of the regulatory program of the 1999 Communications Review had in fact been an answer to that question
whether it would not be sufficient — after having reached the
stage of “full competition” — to rely on (general) competition
law alone, rather than to carry on (also) with sector specific
(and framework) regulations for communications services. In
the context of the Green Paper on Convergence, there had already been a strongly supported opinion that EU competition
law would, at least in the near future, be fully sufficient to
handle the problems of telecommunications.147 But there were
a number of deficiencies in competition law.148 Among them the
local loop situation. Whereas, looking at the European situation in general, at the level of the trunk networks, there was a
fair amount of services and infrastructure competition in
Europe. The incumbent telecommunications operators had still
kept an almost natural monopoly in the area of the “last mile”
or “local loop” or “subscriber network,” a situation which allowed for hardly anything else than service based competition
in this field. Or, as Herbert Ungerer had keenly observed in
1999:
[W]hile we have changed successfully the regulatory fram ework across Europe and . . . as well as in implementation control, we have not changed market structures. In all EU Member States . . . the incumbents continue to have a firm bottleneck control on competition in the local loop. Europe has deregulated, but it has done this without a divestiture. 149

New technologies, like wireless services, did not necessarily
change this situation, since the question of which of the local
lines would eventually be accepted by the subscriber adds additional investment risks. In the Commission’s view, what it
called “regulatory minimalism” did not imply leaving interve ntion to competition law alone. The urgency of this situation
explains why the Commission had moved ahead so vigo rously
147. See id. at 322 n.1.
148. See id. at 322.
149. Herbert Ungerer, Local Loop Unbundling, Keynote Address at London
Business School. (June 14, 1999),
at http://www.europa.eu.int/
comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1999_011_en.html.
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in the area of the local loop without waiting for the fate of the
other parts of the new regulatory package.
The remaining five “harmonization” directive proposals
(framework, access and interconnection, authorization, universal services and users’ rights and data protection)150 which will
now be the center of our further interest,151 are also progressing at different speeds. The Commission had initially planned
to pass the whole package by the end of 2001. As shown, it has
only succeeded with regard to the local loop issue. By September 2001, four proposals had their First Reading in Parliament,
and the Council had reached political agreement on a “Common
Position”152 on those four153 — the proposal on data protection
150. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
151. For a very detailed, yet highly readable analysis of the status of the
package as of April 2001, see Robert Queck, Vers un Nouveau Cadre Réglementaire Européen des Réseaux et Services de Communications Électroniques:
Réflexions á Mi-Chemin, 9 REVUE UBIQUITÉ 41 (2001).
152. Political agreement means agreement on a “common position” in principal while the exact wording is still being framed in appropriate committees.
See ROWE & M AW’S EU COMPETITION AND TRADE GROUP , EUROPEAN
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS S ECTOR 1 (June 2001), available at
http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/london/pdf/ec_comms_jun01.pdf [hereinafter ROWE & M AW’S EU COMPETITION AND TRADE G ROUP]. Such agreement was
reached for the framework proposal, the access and interconnection proposal
and the authorization proposal in the meeting of the Telecommunications
Council (the responsible ministers for telecommunications from the Member
States) in its meeting in April 2001. See Press Release, 2340th Council Meeting, Transport/Telecommunications (Apr. 4-5, 2001), available at
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?MAX=1&BID=87&DID=66088&LAN
G=1 [hereinafter 2340th Council Meeting]. Political agreement on the universal service proposal was reached in the meeting of the Telecommunications Council in June 2001. See ROWE & M AW’S EU COMPETITION AND TRADE
GROUP , supra note 152, at 1.
153. The first proposal is the Amended Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, COM(01)380
final [hereinafter Amended Framework Proposal]. For the current state of
the drafting of the Common Position in the Council, see Council of the European Union Brussels, Outcome of Proceedings, Draft Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communications Networks and Services – Common Positions, May
11, 2001, Interinstitutional File 2000/0184 (COD) 8208/01 ECO 116 CODEC
357.
The second proposal is the Amended Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Access to, and Interconnection of,
Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities, COM(01)369
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is still waiting for the First Reading,154 and any fast agreement
on this issue is highly unlikely.155 It is assumed now that the
package will be passed in Spring 2002, with an obligation for
the Member States to transform the directives into national
law by 2003. For reasons given in the introduction, an overview of the most important substantive elements of the proposals will be based on the original proposals as presented by the
Commission in 2000.

final [hereinafter Amended Interconnection Proposal]. For the current state
of the drafting of the Common Position in the Council, see Council of the
European Union Brussels, Outcome of Proceedings, Draft Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Access to, and Interconnection of,
Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities – Common
Position, May 11, 2001, Interinstitutional File 2000/0186 (COD) 8200/01ECO
114 CODEC 355.
The third proposal is the Amended Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and the Council on the Authorisation of Electronic
Communications Networks and Services, COM(01)372 final [hereinafter
Amended Authorization Proposal]. For the current state of the drafting of
the Common Position in the Council, see Council of the European Union
Brussels, Draft Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the
Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and Services – Common Position, May 11, 2001, Interinstitutional File 2000/0188 (COD) 8203/01
ECO 115CODEC 356.
The fourth proposal is the Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, COM(00)392. For
the current state of the drafting of the Common Position in the Council, see
Council of the European Union Brussels, Draft Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, July 6, 2001, Interinstitutional File 10661/01 ECO 211 CODEC 717.
154. For the current state of the drafting of the Common Position in the
Council, see Council of the European Union Brussels, 29 June 2001, Outcome
of Proceedings, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, Interinstitutional File
2000/0189 (COD) 10451/01ECO 202 CODEC 677. There is still disagreement
on the question of unsolicited communications and French and British delegations still maintain parliamentary scrutiny reservations. Id.
155. See Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings of Working Party on Telecommunications, July 23, 2001, Interinstitutional File
2000/0189 (COD) 11164/01 ECO 221 CODEC 778.
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2. Some Observations on the Substance of the Regulatory
Package
The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on a Commo n Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (“Framework
Proposal” or “FP”) maintains the convergence approach and the
content/conduit-division, however, “it is open to address contents issues in the interest of media pluralism, cultural diversity and consumer protection.”156 The Framework Proposal consequently defines its objects of regulation as: (1) electronic
communications networks; (2) electronic communications services; and (3) associated facilities:
“[E]lectronic communications network” means transmission
systems and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of
signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and
packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial
networks, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, “powerline” systems and cable TV networks, irrespective
of the type of information conveyed. 157
“[E]lectronic communications service” means services pr ovided for remuneration which consist wholly or mainly in the
transmission and routing of signals on electronic communications networks, including telecommunications services and
transmission services in networks used for broadcasting, but
excluding services providing, or exercising editorial control
over, content transmitted using electronic communications
networks and services,158[and]
....
“[A]ssociated facilities” means those facilities associated with
an electronic communications network and/or an electronic
communications service, to which enable and/or support the
provision of services via that network and/or service. It includes conditional access systems and electronic programme
guides. 159
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Framework Proposal, supra note 133.
Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, art. 2(a).
Id. art. 2(b).
Id. art. 2(d).
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With these definitions, the FP has, of course, followed the
conve rgence approach by integrating the transport side of radio
and television and Internet services. At a closer look, however,
and as a result of what might be called the convergence trap,
this integration is more a textual than a functional integration.
One of the main reasons for separate regulatory cultures in
telecommunications and electronic mass media has been the
content sensitivity of the latter. If one leaves untouched contents in a converging approach, as was the declared intention
of the Green Paper on Convergence and the 1999 Communications Review, conve rgence remains a formality. But even on the
formal level, the new regulatory package prefers to place telecommunications, radio and television regulations side by side
under a common heading rather than seeking functional integration in one new conduit concept. And as indicated above,
contents comes back even on that level as the must carry rules.
To call this result “a merger of hitherto separate regulatory
cultures”160 sounds slightly euphemistic.
What the Framework Proposal does achieve, however, is
changing the benc hmark of intervention for the NRAs. The
basic market oriented question of a sector specific approach is
when to allow authorities to set ex ante obligations for market
participants. In the pre-1999 Communications Review regulatory framework, the threshold of intervention, or “significant
market power” (“SMP”), was defined as follows:
An organization shall be presumed to have significant market
power when it has a share of more than 25% of a particular
telecommunications market in the geograph ical area in a
Member State within which it is authorized to operate. National regulatory authorities may nevertheless determine that
an organization with a market share of less than 25% in the
relevant market has significant market power. They may also
determine that an organization with a market share of more
than 25% in the relevant market does not have significant
market power. In either case, the determination shall take
into account the organization’s ability to influence market
160. Director General Robert Verrue, The New Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communications, Remarks at the Roundtable on Multi-Media and
Telecommunications on the Future of Spectrum Management Organized by
the European Institute (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.eurunion.org/
news/speeches/2001/ 010510rv.htm.
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conditions, its turnover relative to the size of the market, its
control of the means of access to end-users, its access to financial resources and its experience in pr oviding products and
services in the market. 161

This definition was seen as too formal to take fully into account the fact that since the gradual liberalization of the late
1990’s, the situation of the incumbent national telecommunications operators which had originally been the addressees of
that regulation was changing. Also, the SMP concept could not
sufficiently address situations where a small number of companies were exercising oligopoly power. And finally, this definition still left a large amount of discretion for intervention by
the NRAs. The Commission had therefore intended to set a
more clearly defined threshold for ex ante regulatory interve ntion.162 In the FP, the definition of SMP moves away from a
numerical benchmark notion. It now seeks to harmonize the
definition with the general competition law definition (the concept of “dominance”), and with the interpretation of this definition by the ECJ, justifying this move explicitly by referring,
e.g., to oligopoly situations.
Article 13 of the FP now gives the following definition of
SMP:
Undertakings with significant market power
1. Where the Specific Measures require national regulatory
authorities to determine whether operators have significant
market power, paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply.
2. An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant
market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it
enjoys a position of economic strength affording it the power
to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.
3. Where an undertaking has significant market power on a
specific market, it may also be deemed to have significant
market power on a closely related market, where the links between the two markets are such as to allow the market power
held in one market to be leveraged into the other market,
161. Parliament and Council Directive 97/33, supra note 91, art. 4(3). The
same definition can be found in the directives on leased lines, voice telephony
and authorization. See Parliament and Council Directive 97/51, supra note
89, art. 2(3); Parliament and Council Directive 98/10, supra note 92, art.
2(2)(i); Parliament and Council Directive 97/13, supra note 90, art. 2(2).
162. See S CHERER, supra note 81, at 38.
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thereby strengthening the market power of the undertaking.163

163. Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, art. 13. The Framework Proposal therefore introduces rather a complex procedure for determining such markets in Article 14:
Market analysis procedure
1. After a public consultation and consultation with national regulatory authorities through the Advisory Communications Group, the
Commission shall issue a Decision on Relevant Product and Service
Markets (hereinafter “the Decision”), addressed to Member States.
The Decision shall identify those product and service markets within
the electronic communications sector, the characteristics of which
may be such as to justify the imposition of regulatory obligations set
out in the Specific Measures, without prejudice to markets that may
be defined in specific cases under competition law. The Commission
shall also publish Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment
of significant market power (hereinafter “the Guidelines”), which
shall be in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice and
the Court of First Instance of the European Communities.
The Commission may indicate in the Decision those markets
which are trans-national. In such markets, the national regulatory
authorities concerned shall jointly conduct the market analysis and
decide on any imposition of regulatory obligations under paragraphs
2 to 5 in a concerted fashion.
National regulatory authorities shall seek and receive the prior
agreement of the Commission before using market definitions that
are different from those identified in the Decision or before imposing
sector-specific regulatory obligations on markets other than those
identified in the Decision. The Commission shall regularly review
the Decision and the Guidelines.
2. Within two months of the date of adoption of the Decision or
any updating thereof, national regulatory authorities shall carry out
an analysis of the product and service markets identified in the Decision, in accordance with the Guidelines. Member States shall ensure that national competition authorities are fully associated with
that analysis. The national regulatory authorities’ analysis of each
market shall be published.
3. Where a national regulatory authority is required under Articles 16, 25 or 27 of Directive 2000/. . . /EC [on universal service and
users rights relating to electronic communications networks and services], or Articles 7 or 8 of Directive 2000/. . . /EC [on access to and
interconnection of electronic communications networks and associated facilities] to determine whether to impose, maintain or withdraw obligations on undertakings, it shall determine on the basis of
its market analysis referred to in paragraph 2 whether a market
identified in the Decision is effectively competitive in a specific geographic area in accordance with the Guidelines.
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In practice this means that, as explained in the recital of the
FP ex ante obligations, NRAs:
[A]re justified only for undertakings which have financed infrastructure on the basis of special or exclusive rights in areas
where there are legal, technical or economic barriers to market entry, in particular for the construction of network infr astructure, or which are vertically integrated entities owning
or operating network infrastructure for delivery of services to
customers and also providing services over that infrastructure, to which their competitors necessarily require access. 164

This more general definition, although clarified by ECJ case
law, makes a concise (and harmonized) definition of the relevant market even more important, because that market definition now defines the ex ante possibilities for the interventions
of NRAs.
On the one hand, the (independent) NRAs remain free in
their decision on which undertaking to select as a SMP to become the subject of ex ante measures (as foreseen in the specific directives of the package). However, on the other hand, the
criteria for their decision making, the Commission Working
Document on Proposed New Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (“Draft Guidelines”), and in particular the definition of the markets which
are the basis of market power analysis, remain subject to the

4. Where a national regulatory authority concludes that the market is effectively competitive, it shall not impose sector specific regulatory obligations set out in the Specific Measures. In cases where
such sector specific regulatory obligations already exist, it shall
withdraw such obligations placed on undertakings in that specific
market. An appropriate period of notice shall be given to parties affected by such a withdrawal of obligations.
5. Where a national regulatory authority determines that a market identified in the Decision is not effectively competitive in a specific geographic area in accordance with the Guidelines, it shall impose the sector-specific regulatory obligations set out in the Specific
Measures, or maintain such obligations where they already exist.
6. Measures taken pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be subject to the procedure set out in Article 6.
Id. art. 14.
164. Id. ¶ 20.
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discretion of the Commission.165 Since such “definition decisions” of the Commission are not regulatory in the proper
sense, and do not affect the decisions of the NRAs directly, the
process of making such definition decisions is not embedded in
the usual procedures of Commission decision making power.166
Such specific procedures are only foreseen where the Commission makes decisions in the area of standardization167 and
harmonization,168 and in some of the specific directives of the
proposal package.
The definition of SMP and the resulting actions by the NRAs
are thus embedded in complex definition procedures. In addition, the NRAs have to observe information, consultation and
165. See Commission Working Document on Proposed New Regulatory
Framework, supra note 4.
166. The general rules for Commission decision making power are now set
out in Council Decision 1999/468 of 28 June 1999 Laying Down the Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers Conferred on the Commission,
1999 O.J. (L 184) 23. This decision on procedures differentiates between four
types of procedures of interaction between the Commission and the Member
States for those areas where the Commission has decision making powers: (1)
advisory procedure (art. 3); (2) management procedure (art. 4); (3) regulatory
procedure (art. 5); and (4) safeguard procedure (art. 6). Id. The most important is the regulatory procedure. If there is disagreement between the Commission and the committee of representatives of the Member States during
that procedure, a complex resolution procedure takes place involving the
Parliament and the Council with a slight structural advantage of the Commission because of the way the procedures are laid out and because of time
limits imposed. This structure is generally referred to as “comitology.” For
further discussion, see FISCHER, supra note 14, at 79. This complex pattern
of interaction is not unusual but reflects the framework of the Commission’s
rule making power. In the context of the (general) data protection directive,
see, e.g., Parliament and Council Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 3 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 95/46]. The Commission centralizes the power to
make the decisions on the “adequate level of protection” provided by third
countries. Id. art. 25(6). In this decision, the Commission is advised by the
committee of independent data protection authorities which in this case is
called the “Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data.” Id. art. 29. The measures the Commission
intends to undertake are submitted to the representatives of the Member
States, which together with the Commission representative form the “Committee.” Id. art. 31.
167. See Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, arts. 15(4), 19(2)(3).
168. Id. art. 16(1)-(2).
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publication procedures. Having brought the SMP definition
nearer to the competition law definition of “dominance” does
not exclude differences. As the Draft Guidelines point out:
18. To ensure consistency of approaches, these Guidelines
are based on . . . existing jurisprudence of the Court of First
Instance and the Court of Justice concerning market definition and the notion of dominant position within the meaning
of Article 82 of the EC Treaty . . . .
19. Markets defined by the Commission and NCAs [national competition authorities] in competition cases may, nevertheless, vary from those identified in the Commission Decision and from market definitions identified by NRAs. . . . The
market definitions used by NRAs are without prejudice to
those used by NCAs and by the Commission in the exer-

cise of their respective powers.

20. In practice, parallel procedures under ex ante regulation and competition law may arise with respect to different
kinds of problems in relevant markets. NCAs may therefore
investigate a market and market behaviour and impose appropriate competition law remedies alongside any sector specific measures applied by NRAs. However; it must be noted
that such simultaneous application of remedies by different
regulators would address different problems in such markets.
21. NRAs will exercise their powers under Article 14 of [the
Framework Proposal] to determine whether to designate undertakings in the market as having SMP. In so doing, NRAs
enjoy considerable discretion in the exercise of their powers,
with respect to the complexity of inter -related factors that
must be assessed concerning the economic, factual and legal
elements of identified markets, subject to the consultation
and transparency procedure foreseen.169

Even this remaining “decisional freedom” of the NRAs needs
additional control to prevent the decisions from undermining
the criteria. The “transparency mechanism”170 in the FP therefore requires NRAs to provide the Commission with draft
measures (ex ante measures following from the SMP assessment171 and measures in the context of the proposed directive

169. See Commission Working Document on Proposed New Regulatory
Framework, supra note 4, at 6.
170. Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, art. 6.
171. See id. art. 14(4)-(5).
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on “access and interconnection”172) after a period of consultation on the national and EU level. As a backup measure, the
Commission reserves the right to intervene if the objectives of
an open and competitive market and/or the regulatory principles173 are not met.174
This approach in the new regulatory package has, of course,
already created some resistance. The Commission, it was felt,
losing out on the ERA model, sought to establish a functional
equivalent. Robert Verrue, Director General of the Commission
Directorate responsible for telecommunications, answered this
criticism in a recent a speech in the U.S.:
[L]et me outline our thinking. The electronic communications
market is developing at an unprecedented speed. National
regulators are closest to their market, so it should be for them
to tailor regulation to fit the circumstances of that market.
The new Directives leave a very large degree of flexibility to
national regulators. NRAs assess the degree of competition on
a given product market in their territory. They decide what
obligations to impose. They decide which operators will be
subject to those rules. The proposal from the Commission
seek [sic] to counter-balance this decentralisation of decision
making with strong co-ordination mechanisms to ensure
consistency of application of the rules. The over-riding
rationale for a regulatory framework at [the] European level
is to ensure a minimum level of harmonisation. Similar firms
should be subject to similar obligations in similar market
circumstances, wherever they operate in the EU.175

While the author intended to basically restrict the analysis to
the state of the July 2000 proposals, it nevertheless seems useful to warn that the Council (in its meeting in April 2001) has
already shown its reluctance to follow the Commission. In its
view, the “transparency mechanism” should run only as follows:
The Commission may make public a detailed opinion which it
shall communicate to the NRA concerned stating why it considers that the draft measure is not compatible with Community law. The NRA may adopt the envisaged measures after
172.
173.
174.
175.

Amended Interconnection Proposal, supra note 153, art. 8(2).
See Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, art. 7.
See id. art. 6(4)-(6).
See Verrue, supra note 160.
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the publication of the detailed opinion of the Commission, and
shall communicate them to the Commission. Where the NRA
does not follow the Commission’s opinion, it shall give its reasoning.176

As seen from the Commission proposal which has already
taken in the comments of the Parliament’s First Reading (although not following them completely), this approach is not
what the Commission intended. It will now largely depend on
the Parliament’s Second Reading and if necessary, the conciliation procedure to arrive at results.177
In general, we are witnessing once again an attempt to strike
what might be called a “dynamic balance” between centripetal
forces, as represented by the Commission, and centrifugal
forces, as represented by the Member States. What remains
interesting to observe is that the instruments with which the
Commission seeks to maintain its influence have become more
refined, aiming at setting information and consultation duties,
as well as defining criteria for establishing thresholds rather
than seeking direct intervention. Closely connected to this tension between the Commission and the NRAs is the other main
instrument for regulatory authorities: the licensing (authorization) procedure.
a. The Authorization Proposal
The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on the Authorization of Electronic Communications Networks and Services (“Authorization Proposal” or
“AP”)178 had its First Reading in the Parliament and passed the
(Telecommunications) Council in April 2001. Observations are,
as above, based basically on the Commission’s original AP but
not without a glimpse at the Commission’s reflections after the
First Reading in the Parliament.179

176. See 2340th Council Meeting, supra note 152.
177. For details on the European Union Co-Decision Procedure for Regulations and Directives, see FISCHER, supra note 14, at 77.
178. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and Services, COM(00)386 final.
179. See Amended Authorization Proposal, supra note 153.
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The Authorization Proposal sets out the general conditions of
authorization for electronic communication services and networks, as defined in the FP. Authorization (licensing) is a particularly crucial area since, in practice, this is where NRAs
leave their mark, as the Commission seems painfully aware.
In 1992, and independently of its policy as regards a potential
ERA, the Commission had already tried to at least introduce a
mutual recognition system, an approach always used when
Member States’ resistance to harmonization seems too strong.
But the Commission failed, another example that the telecom
regulatory process has witnessed occasional defeat.180 The Licensing Directive 181 returned to the traditional harmonization
approach with the intention of reducing ind ividual licensing
occasions,182 and as reme mbrance of dreams gone, it opened the
way for one -stop-shopping procedures which, however, bundled
the licensing decisions of NRAs only organizationally.183
The current Authorization Proposal continues with the trad itional approach by emphasizing general authorizations, harmonizing and raising the substantive contents of such authorizations. Since the AP is now a “convergence proposal,” it has
grown larger, incorporating specific sections on radio-frequency
authorizations, thus providing an example that convergence
can also be reached simply by combining different regulations
under a single heading. The most crucial issue, however, is the
fee issue. Based on unpleasant experiences, the AP approaches
this issue in far more detail than in the old Licensing Directive
in order to put stronger control on the Member States’ NRA fee
policies. There is, of course, the “internal market stick” giving
the Commission power of interve ntion:
Where divergences between national charges, fees, pr ocedures
or conditions concerning general authorisation or the grant of
180. For a description of the failure, see LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 416
n.450.
181. Parliament and Council Directive 97/13, supra note 90.
182. See LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 416.
183. See Parliament and Council Directive 97/13, supra note 90, art. 13.
This procedure is not restricted to Member States and is organized in the
context of CEPT by the European Telecommunications Office (“ETO”). These
functions are now being carried out by the European Radiocommunications
Office (“ERO”), located in Copenhagen, which took over all ETO functions as
of Jan. 2001. See CEPT Organisation, at http://www.ero.dk (last visited Mar.
18, 2002).
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rights of use create barriers to the internal market, the Commission may adopt measures to harmonise such charges, fees,
procedures or conditions in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 19(3) of Directive [on a common regulatory
framework for electronic communications networks and services]. 184

b. The Access and Interconnection Proposal
Observations are based on the Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Access
to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities.185 The general principle remains that interconnection agreements may be requested, and
are then negotiated among undertakings.186 Interconnection
obligations may be imposed, amended and withdrawn on SMP
operators following the procedure set up in the FP.187 Obligations may also be imposed on undertakings with SMP regarding access to only specific network facilities.188 Existing interconnection obligations remain in operation, but the NRAs are
required to review them taking into account the new definitions of SMP.189 Interconnection itself remains based on nondiscrimination, cost-oriented pricing and transparency, and
allows explicitly for access to specific network elements.190 Providers of conditional access systems (e.g., digital television) are
required to offer access on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.191 Decisions will be made according to
market development on the basis of the comitology structure
envisaged in the FP. Again, in working on its common position, the Council is trying to reduce the possible impact of the
Commission, mostly in the area of cond itional access systems.

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Amended Authorization Proposal, supra note 153, art. 16.
Amended Interconnection Proposal, supra note 153.
See id. arts. 3-4.
See id. arts. 5, 8.
Id. art. 12.
Id. art. 7.
See id. arts. 9-12.
See Amended Interconnection Proposal, supra note 153, art. 6.
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c. The Universal Service and Users’ Rights Proposal
Observations are based on the Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services (“Universal Service Proposal” or “USP”).192 The USP addresses the traditional unive rsal service obligations. It includes regulations on the choice of
designated universal service operators by the Member States,
including new provisions on cost assessment and recovery of
costs by these operators.193 Member States must find the most
efficient way to attribute universal service, opening the opportunity to all undertakings and using allocation mechanisms for
part or all universal service obligations either by tender or auction.194 There is a specific requirement for the Commission to
review the scope of universal service obligations195 and a prescribed procedure for this task.196 The rather narrow scope of
universal service according to the USP, if compared to the
U.S.,197 is comprised of:
[A]ll reasonable requests for connection to the public telephone network at a fixed location and for access to publicly
available telephone services at a fixed location are met by at
least one operator. . . . The connection provided shall be capable of allowing users to make and receive local, national and
international telephone calls, facsimile communications and
data communications, at data rates that are sufficient to
permit Internet access.”198

Further requirements include: (1) adequate directory enquiry
services and directories;199 (2) if so decided by the NRA, public
192. See Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136.
193. See id. arts. 3-13.
194. Id. art. 8.
195. Id. art. 15.
196. Id. at annex V.
197. For example, the European definition does not comprise the provision
of broadband communications for health care establishment, nor internet
access for schools. The Commission is of the opinion that such services
should be financed by the appropriate government departments and not by
the telecommunications sector, although the proposal would allow for direct
government payments also within the framework of telecommunications.
198. Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136, art. 4.
199. Id. art. 5.
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payphones with the possibility of free emergency calls;200 (3)
special measures for disabled and specific needs users;201 and
(4) special provisions for users with low incomes or with special
needs, including user enabling techniques for cost control.202
The quality of services is to be monitored by the NRAs.203
Cost recovery can be obtained through special funds or from
general government budgets. There is no longer a universal
service surcharge on interconnection prices.204 In view of
Community enlargement and the ensuing wide variety of market situations and different levels of service quality, special
attention is again necessary for undertakings with SMP.
These undertakings can be submitted to retail tariff regulation
by their NRAs in order to prevent distortions of competition.
The NRAs have to observe all procedural obligations, information and publication duties as prescribed for actions in relation
to undertakings with SMP in the Framework Proposal.205
In the general spirit of EU consumer protection, the Unive rsal Service Proposal relies on information duties in the interest
of the consumer rather than on direct intervention. The information requirements of the USP, however, seem either obvious
or of rather low quality;206 tariffs and contractual information
are to be made only sufficiently transparent.207 Yet, while
rather grandly including the promotion of interests of European citizens among the tasks of NRAs, the FP had already
restricted the means of “requiring transparency of tariffs and
conditions for using publicly available electronic communications services; and . . . addressing the needs of specific social
groups, in particular disabled users.”208
Other information related clauses of the USP refer to information on the quality of services.209 There are further consumer protection elements in the USP which relate to specific
issues such as the assurance that all equipment sold in the EU
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 7.
Id. arts. 9-10.
Id. art. 11.
Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136, arts. 12-13.
Id. art. 16.
See id. art. 17.
Id. art. 18.
See Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, art. 7(4).
Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136, art. 19.
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for reception of digital television is technically compatible with
the relevant European standard,210 — an assurance which also
demonstrates that some of these regulations have an astonishing concern for detail, in contrast, it seems, to the relative importance and relevance of the issue.211 Further measures comprise: (1) the right to operator assisted calls; (2) a single directory in a fair and non-discriminatory manner;212 (3) the single
European emergency call number (“112”);213 (4) the existing
requirement of a single international access code (“00”) and the
obligation of operators to handle calls using the new European
regional code (“3883”);214 (5) the obligation for all public access
210. See id. art. 20.
211. See, e.g., id. at annex VI. It specifies under which conditions these
assurances apply:
Any analogue television set with an integral screen of visible diagonal greater than 42 cm which is put on the market for sale or
rent in the Community shall be fitted with at least one open interface socket (as standardised by a recognised European standardisation body) permitting simple connection of peripherals, especially
additional decoders and digital receivers.
Any digital television set with an integral screen of visible diagonal greater than 30 cm which is put on the market for sale or rent in
the Community shall be fitted with at least one open interface socket
(either standardised by a recognised European standardisation body
or conforming to an industry-wide specification) permitting simple
connection of peripherals, and able to pass all the elements of a digital television signal. Apart from video and audio streams, this includes conditional access information, the full application programme interface (API) command set of the connected devices, service information and copy protection information.
Id. Such detail is, of course, less astonishing when remembering the EU
industrial policy tradition.
212. Id. art. 21.
213. This includes the already existing requirement of emergency services
to be available free of charge, and adds a provision stipulating that caller
location information be made available to emergency authorities for such
calls. Id. art. 22.
214. Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136, art. 23. The number
“3883” will be a “pan-European” country code for subscribers wishing to establish a “European identity,” or rather a “CEPT identity,” since the code will
apply to subscribers in the fifteen EU Member States (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and in Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, the
Slovak Republic and Switzerland. Id.
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operators to provide additional services (tone dialing and itemized billing) to all citizens (and not just obligations only for
SMP or designated universal service operators), again, however, NRAs are given the option not to require such obligations
if they do not consider them necessary;215 and (6) the obligation
of number portability to mobile operators.216
The proposal also confirms the continuing need for leased
lines and other mandatory services as already regulated in Directive 92/44 (as amended by Directive 97/51).217 The Universal Service Proposal contains a new provision which ensures
proportionate compensation to network operators that bear
must carry obligations in relation to public service broadcasting. One of the few “conve rgence” rules, it states in full:
“Must carry” obligations
1. Member States may impose “must carry” obligations, for
the transmission of specified radio and television broadcasts,
on undertakings under their jurisdiction providing electronic
communications networks established for the distribution of
radio or television broadcasts to the public. Such obligations
shall only be imposed where they are necessary to meet
clearly defined general interest objectives and shall be proportionate, transparent and limited in time.
2. Member States shall ensure that the undertakings subject to “must carry” obligations receive appropriate compensation on reasonable, transparent and non -discriminatory terms
taking into account the network capacity required. 218

The last chapter of the USP deals with procedure (consultation
by national regulatory authorities with user and consumer
groups before adopting national measures).219
d. The Data Protection Proposal
The issue of data protection was dealt with in the working
papers, which were part of the consultation processes after the

215. Id. art. 24.
216. Id. art. 25. This does not apply between mobile and fixed network
operators.
217. Id.
218. Id. art. 26.
219. Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136, arts. 29-36.
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1999 Communications Review,220 and later became part of the
July 2000 package. Observations are based on the Proposal for
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
Concerning the Processing of Pe rsonal Data and the Protection
of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (“Data Protection Proposal” or “DPP”).221
As known from other contexts, in 1995 the EU enacted Council Directive 95/46, a general directive on data protection covering the private sector and the public sector in as far as there is
EU regulatory competence.222 In 1997, the EU also enacted
Council Directive 97/66, a special sector directive on telecommunications.223 In both cases, the Commission had to open infringement proceedings against certain Member States since
they had not transformed the directives into national law
within the time frame set by those directives. Some of these
proceedings are still pending. There was no intention of introducing large changes to the existing situation created by Directives 95/46 and 97/66. It is not without irony that the intention
of this proposal to become (more?) technologically neutral was
induced by changes in the technology.
The Data Protection Proposal puts the intended regulations
under the umbrella of the framework proposal definition and
appends existing regulation accordingly. Since Article 6 (“traffic data”) of Directive 97/66, for example, only referred to
220. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE -GENERAL INFORMATION
S OCIETY, DOC. NO . INSFO A/1DG, COMMUNICATIONS S ERVICES: POLICY AND
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (Apr. 27, 2000).
221. Data Protection Proposal, supra note 137. See also Parliament and
Council Directive 97/66, supra note 137. As discussed previously, the proposal is currently under consideration in the Council for developing a Common Position. The First Reading in Parliament is expected in September
2001. The procedure is unusual but possible. Normally, it is the Council who
reacts to the position of the Parliament with a Common Position, as in the
other elements of the new regulatory package. The Chairman of the Committee on Citizen’s Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs of the Parliament has already indicated that the amendments of the Council are
unlikely to find acceptance in the First Reading of the Parliament. See
sources cited supra note 153. The Council recognizes that this package is
politically, the most difficult element of the package, and since it is the political intention of the Council to see through the whole of the “new regulatory
package” on a single date before the end of 2001, there is a certain interest in
speeding up procedures. Id.
222. Parliament and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 166.
223. Id.
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“calls,”224 adjustments are made to relate these and other
clauses to “the transmission of a communication.”225 Since
technical and organizational opportunities as regards traffic
data have also increased, there is now an express possibility to
allow for processing of this traffic data with the informed consent of the subscriber. Traffic data, however, seems to become
a very controversial issue in the current political debate, if not
the most controversial in the new regulatory package. Law enforcement interests seek extended periods of data retention on
traffic data, as well as access to that data at telecom undertakings.226 There is currently resistance from the Commission,
from some Member States and from telecom undertakings,
since Directive 97/66 had affirmed that traffic data may only be
kept for billing purposes.227
Location data — which will be come more important in view
of mobile-commerce or “m-commerce” — is strictly speaking,
part of traffic data and regulated as such by Directive 97/66.
But in view of this information becoming more precise, an explicit article appeared to be necessary. This article, however,
only repeats the basic principle of directive 97/66: subscribers
should have the choice (of temporarily disabling the location
device — similar to “caller ID”) and should give prior consent.228 This does not alter already existing exemptions —
again in the context of caller identification — in emergency
situations and by Member States’ legislation for law enforcement purposes.229
In view of technological changes and new social and economic
uses, the basic assumption of Directive 97/66 — that a central
directory service should be maintained with a default rule of
entering subscribers into such a directory — can no longer be

224. Parliament and Council Directive 97/66, supra note 137, art. 6(1).
225. Data Protection Proposal, supra note 137, art. 6(1) (emphasis added).
226. Work is progressing on a resolution to replace the Council Resolution
of 17 January 1995 on the Lawful Interception of Telecommunications, 1996
O.J. (C 329) 1, which was not published until the end of 1996. For the current status of this legislation, see Council Resolution 9194/01 on Law Enforcement Operational Needs with Respect to Public Telecommunications and
Services, June 20, 2001, at http://www.ue.eu.int.
227. See Parliament and Council Directive 97/66, supra note 137, art. 6(2).
228. See Data Protection Proposal, supra note 137, art. 9.
229. Id. arts. 10, 15.
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maintained. It will now be the choice of the subscriber to decide
in which directories to appear and with what information.230
Another issue likely to remain controversial is the protection
against unsolicited calls. Here the Data Protection Proposal
has, while extending the definition, given up the idea of technological neutrality once again: for “automated calling systems
without human intervention (automatic calling machines), facsimile machines (fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of direct marketing,” the default rule is now that such communication is forbidden unless the subscriber has consented.231 As regards the other forms of “communication,” the opt-out or opt-in
choice is left to regulation in the Member States.232 And this
only applies to natural persons — as regards other entities,
“Member States shall also ensure . . . that the legitimate interests of subscribers other than natural persons with regard to
unsolicited communications are sufficiently protected.”233 One
reason for controversy is that the Electric Commerce Directive
already provides for a Member State’s solution for e-mail. 234
Finally, the Data Protection Proposal addresses the possibilities of privacy enhancing technologies.235 The DPP suggests
that the Commission might propose measures to ensure that
terminal equipment incorporates the necessary safeguards to
guarantee the protection of personal data and privacy of users
and subscribers.236
3. Summary
Considering all these content descriptions, what then are the
main characteristics of change initiated by the 1999 Communications Review, or more precisely, what are the main charac230. Id. art. 12.
231. Id. art. 13(1).
232. Id. art. 13(2).
233. Id. art. 13(3).
234. See Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 116, art. 7.
235. For a discussion of these technologies, see Herbert Burkert, PrivacyEnhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision, in TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY : THE NEW LANDSCAPE 125 (1998).
236. See Parliament and Council Directive 1999/5 of 9 March 1999 on Radio
Equipment and Telecommunications Equipment and the Mutual Recognition
of Their Conformity, 1999 O.J. (L 91) 10; Council Decision 87/95 of 22 December 1986 on Standardization in the Field of Information Technology and
Telecommunications, 1987 O.J. (L 36) 31.
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teristics of the proposed changes that still have to emerge from
the rule making process and be implemented in national law?:
(1) After initial hesitation, the EU has addressed the local
loop issue as the most pressing structural problem of telecommunication markets with impressive decisiveness: unbundled
access to the local loop, either exclusively or shared, has been
implemented, with the basic principles of non-discrimination,
co-location and cost-orientation on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and with the requirement of standard
publicized offers for undertakings with SMPs.
(2) With regard to the relationship between the Commission
and the NRAs, there is an attempt, although somewhat cached
in regulatory speech, to arrive at better co-ordination and to
ensure faster and more comprehensive alignment with the
rules of EU telecommunications regulations. Since this issue is
essential for the future of the regulatory landscape in Europe,
it will receive further scrutiny in Part IV below.
(3) The new regulatory package attempts to reflect convergence. The approach seems to be more one of verbal regulatory
technique than of full functional integration: definitions are
extended, articles on specific electronic (mass) media developments are added rather than integrated, not always necessarily
reflecting the intention of a more technology neutral approach.
The package does not address contents, except when explicitly
opening the possibility of must carry obligations.
(4) The basic addressee of ex ante intervention, the undertaking with SMP, will now be defined in closer harmony with
the definitions of general competition law intervention, although not necessarily exactly in the same manner and not
necessarily with more clarity.
(5) The main intention of the authorization proposal is to
achieve better control over the varying fee practices in the
Member States.
(6) The access and interconnection proposal mainly ensures
that definitions and terminology are adjusted to the new
framework and the convergence aim.
(7) The same seems to apply to the more ex post oriented
proposals of universal service and users’ rights, except perhaps
that review procedures for financing models by NRAs have to
take place at more regular intervals. Certain service features
are now expanded into the area of mobile telephony. There are
no fundamental changes to the definition of universal services.
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(8) Finally, in the area of data protection, we again see adjustments of terminology to the broader scope of the convergence philosophy, while old conflicts continue, albeit now perhaps with a more data protection minded Commi ssion.
In all, there is no basic change observable. Whether the regulatory hand of the Commission will be lighter or heavier on
NRAs is yet to be decided or rather experienced. The regulatory material now appears better structured and organized,
and it might facilitate regulatory orientation for NRAs, undertakings, users and consumers. This would then be the general
description of the emerging post-deregulatory landscape for
telecommunications in the EU, with one exception: in the material examined, the original plans analyzed, the pre-1999
Communications Review spirit remembered, the discussions
watched and the exchanges followed, there seem to be indications of a deeper change, a change that does not necessarily
originate in developments of the telecommunications markets,
but one that might eventually influence the outcome of the tensions between the Commission and the Member States’ authorities, or rather between the Commission and the Member
States’ view on the role of their NRAs.
IV. A SECOND LOOK: A “NATURAL H ISTORY OF R EGULATION ” OR
THE “UNIQUE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE”
There are, of course, many other questions to be asked about
the role of transparency and the involvement of consumers and
users outside the traditional structures of the current built-up
of regulatory agencies. There is enough writing on the wall;
even the imperfect and perhaps soon obsolete Internet Corporation for Names and Numbers model is casting its shadow. To
this day, there is no comprehensive comparative study on national regulatory authorities that focuses on the transparency
of procedures or the integration of public interest representations in their organizational and procedural structure. 237
237. This approach would, of course, also be necessary on the level of EU
institutions. In the area of transparency, there have been considerable efforts
by Community institutions over the last years. See, e.g., Parliament Council
Regulation 1049/2001, supra note 75. Against the general trend of skepticism, the EU has enforced its attempts to address its legitimacy, governance
and acceptance problems, again, however, mainly in view of preparing acceptance for yet further treaty changes and, of course, the enlargement. See
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We, however, shall put our selves to a less ambitious task.
The general understanding of the changes described above,
taking the 1999 Communications Review as the watershed,
often summarizes as if they provided a sort of “natural history
of telecommunications regulations” where one moves from the
natural monopoly to breaking this monopoly, taming the incumbents, ensuring access and entry and gradually making
regulation disappear. This Article has shown these developments — as unfinished as they are and as limited to a particular period in EU telecommunications regulations — in some
detail because they may answer the long-standing question
whether the development towards the post-deregulatory landscape, towards regulation with a lighter touch, may indeed be
read as a natural development where the Commission and the
Member States only had to make one effort in the early 1980’s
to give the clauses on services in the general economic interest
a push.
A. Revisiting the NRA and ERA Issue
Already, the current situation does not reflect such easiness,
if we review the previous account. The local loop problem had
to be addressed by a regulation, the strongest instrument in
EU telecommunications law. The Commission still carries on
with a large number of breach of treaty procedures against the
Member States who are still battling with the pre-1999 Communications Review regulatory package. The issue of an ERA
appeared, and seems to have disappeared again. The relationship between the NRA and the Commission is characterized as
critical in the new regulatory package. The universal service
issue seems to stand fairly high on current agendas, while in
the early telecommunications policy documents the issue was
hardly evident. Telecommunications privacy does not have a
clear cut profile. And there is a highly critical debate on the
regulatory package as such, and neither in the Council nor the
Parliament do all elements of the package receive an equally
easy ride.
The issue of an ERA seems to show most clearly the first
cracks of deeper tectonic changes. At minimum, the outside
generally Commission of the European Communities, European Governance:
A White Paper, COM(01)428 final.
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observer will see that the Commission’s (and the Parliament’s)
toying with the idea of an ERA was at least influenced by the
example of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).
EU competition law in general has been driven by the American example, and to a large extent was designed by Americans,
even if the empirical and historical evidence is, while basically
acknowledged, occasionally downplayed.238 Would it be useful
to have an institution like the FCC on the European level,
eventually as a counterpart in the “regulatory world series”?
Although there are a number of constitutional problems in
setting up a regulatory agency of some sort on the EU level, or
delegating rule-making power from existing institutions to
such an institution,239 the issue of an ERA has always been and
continues to be a strong wish, although it is not always clear
who the wisher is. The ERA theme certainly provides a leitmotiv of the regulatory developments described so far and also
echoes the old (albeit not always clearly expressed) double-bind
situation in which Europe looks at the United States: always a
dream and always a fear, always an attraction and always a
repulsion.
With or without that American-centered addition, the notion
of an ERA has been put forward by the Parliament at various
occasions.240 Even the “euro-centric world open,” — then famous (and now somewhat lesser referred to as such) —
“Bangemann Group” had suggested such an authority in 1994,
at a time when reference to a “High Level Group” consisting
purely of industrialists was still considered to bring enlightened guidance to European policies. 241
While it was the Parliament that put the issue on the agenda
of the 1999 Communication Review, the Commission itself had
undertaken various studies on its own to test the ground.242
The actual position of the Commission remained difficult to
238. For a history of European integration and the influence of U.S. competition law, see DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY EUROPE : P ROTECTING PROMETHEUS 334 (1998).
239. For further detail, see Yataganas, supra note 125.
240. For further references to EU action in this field, see LAROUCHE , supra
note 18, at 414.
241. Robert Queck, The Future of National Telecommunications Regulatory
Authorities, in 2 T HE JOURNAL OF POLICY , REGULATION AND S TRATEGY FOR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION AND M EDIA 251, 259 (2000).
242. For further detail, see LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 415.
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ascertain. There are different currents of opinion in the Commission, and which of these currents or which mix of those currents see the light of an official document is the result of complex interactions within and among the General Directorates.
In a statement in the EC Competition Policy Newsletter, a
Commission official from the Competition General Directorate
elaborated on the issue, indicating that a commissioned study
did favor a specific EU institutional arrangement short of an
ERA.243 The official, of course, remained non-committal and
emphasized, as usual, “subsidiarity” and “co-operation.”244 In
the Green Paper on Convergence, there were, however, some
comments alarming for those who had been skeptical of a new
European authority. Since these comments are a very good example of “Commission speak” and the way the Commission
deals with critical points, a quote seems illustrative. Appropriately, the Commission starts with a bow to subsidiarity:
In looking at the options for a possible future regulatory
model, account must be taken of the way in which responsibilities will continue to be shared between the Community
and Member States and within Member States, between national, regional and sometimes local authorities. From a
Community perspective, the EC Treaty defines on the basis of
subsidiarity those areas in which the Community has a role to
play. Such action may be taken, assuming it is an area for
which the Community is competent, “only if and in so far as
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community.” 245

The Commission then takes the decisive turn:
Given the regional and global nature of many of the services
being delivered, that subsidiarity test may be met. Diverse
national approaches may harm rather than promote users’ interests, could undermine the diversity which the internal
market offers, and may well introduce distortions which fa-

243. See Alexander Schaub, Competition in the Telecoms Sector, EC
COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER, Apr. 1, 1996, at 1, 6-7, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1996_030_en.html.
244. Id.
245. Green Paper on Convergence, supra note 40, at 31.
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vour the establishment of production facilities in regions
where a lighter regime applies. 246

Not surprisingly, some of the questions which the Commission put forward in the Green Paper on Convergence on this
issue may be seen by some as leading questions. However,
something else happened. By explicitly or at least implicitly
turning telecommunications regulation into a convergence issue, and by proposing — again mostly between the lines — to
take the spirit of telecommunications liberalization into mass
media, the Green Paper on Convergence helped to create new
alliances of opposition mainly between the public service telecommunications operators, or rather the “incumbents” and the
providers of public service broadcasting. Traditionally, these
broadcasters still have a high political standing and considerable political impact in at least some Member States. And their
regulatory authorities started to see issues they shared with
telecommunications regulatory authorities, but not necessarily
in the same way as the Green Paper on Convergence seemed to
insinuate.
Nor was the pressure without reaction from the telecommunications NRAs. Apart from the usual pressures and exige ncies, many of these authorities see themselves under a double
weight. On the national level, they have to justify their existence as special regulatory agencies, in addition to general
regulators of competition. On the EU level, they have to defend
their existence as national authorities. The reaction to the
Green Paper on Convergence insinuations regar ding a need for
an ERA was then, it seemed, sufficiently reserved to lead to the
withdrawal of the ERA idea in the 1999 Communications Review. Another way to confront the pressure for an ERA model
has been to show, at least symbolically, the inherently imperfect logic of such an authority. It is imperfect because the process of European unity is still far from complete, and any authority on the EU level would then be asked how European it
really is. Consequently, as one is almost inclined to assume,
NRAs from the EU joined with NRAs from the European Free
Trade Association (“EFTA”) states247 and had formed the Ind e246. Id.
247. European Free Trade Association, at http://www.efta.int/structure
/main/index.htm. Member States are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and
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pendent Regulators Group, slightly emphasizing, perhaps, the
qualification independent.
But something else had also changed. By now, the general
climate had become more skeptical towards liberalization, particularly since the positive, even if only secondary economic
effect of liberalization was not yet evident. Unemployment remained the main economic issue in the EU; euro-skepticism
was growing. December 1998 saw the refusal of the EU budget
by the Parliament, and in January 1999, the “Commission crisis” — the vote of non-confidence by the Parliament which
forced the demission of the Commission —– followed.248 And
most important: The new treaty — the Treaty of Amsterdam —
which had already been in the making at least since October
1997, saw its ratification ensured only in the first half of 1999,
and not without difficulties.
So, with the 1999 Communications Review, the wording for
the relationship between the Commission and the Member
States’ NRAs had changed significantly; there was no longer
any talk of an ERA, and the key word now became “cooperation.”249 However, against the current political background
described above, NRAs may suspiciously look at cooperation for
signs of a functional equivalent of an ERA, even if the term is
no longer fashionable and the window of opportunity for centripetal forces in this area may well be closed for some time. As
we shall see, this is not the only change which, while not necessarily introduced with the new regulatory package, will nevertheless have its impact on that package.
B. The Great Climate Change: The Return of the Public Service
and the Consumer?
A more fundamental change seems to be underway, although
it is far from certain what the result will be. In his speech in
the Summer of 2001, from which this Article quoted several
times, Robert Verrue answered the question “[w]hy have we
made these proposals?” by giving, inter alia, as the main objecSwitzerland. The EU and EFTA (except Switzerland) cooperate on the basis
of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 1992. Id.
248. See Peter Schwartz, The Failed Vote of No-Confidence in the European
Parliament, at http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/ jan1999/parl-j2l.shtml
(Jan. 21, 1999).
249. Queck, supra note 241, at 259.
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tives: “(1) to benefit the citizen; (2) to promote, sustain and
deepen an open and competitive market; [and] (3) to consolidate the EU’s internal market.”250
While this, at first glance, is restating the obvious, the ranking of the objectives is still remarkable. The author recalled in
Part III.A.5., supra, that the notion of the universal service had
entered the regulatory debate at a relatively late stage, only
shortly before the complete liberalization of the market. This
Article has also shown that only about thirty years after its
entry into force, the interpretation of the then EC Treaty Article 90 had changed somewhat dramatically. And it has also
seemed as if this change has largely been accepted in the
Member States and in the perception of the general public, to
the extent that the general public was following these developments at all, due to the disappointment with the level of public service and the changing perception of the natural monopoly.
Recall, however, the increasing influence of the Parliament
due to changes in the general power structure of the EU. Since
the introduction of direct elections (only in 1979), the codecision procedure (1993) and the enlarge ment of this procedure (1999), the Parliament was moving closer to the “end
user” and consumer (and as a side effect, is also now more exposed to temptations from lobbying). It was the Parliament
which started to re-emphasize public interest considerations
and the importance of services in the general economic interest.
In telecommunications, the Parliament had simply to pick up
those cards which the Commission and the Member States had
not yet sufficiently played, because they were to leave the public telephony service until the very last.
The Commission and the Council had appeased the rediscovery of the public interest partly by introducing universal
service parts into the various directives and partly (but mainly
due to other pressures, incentives and developments)251 by emphasizing data protection more strongly. As so often in European politics, and as exemplified with the ERA issue above,
250. Verrue, supra note 160.
251. It should be remembered that it had taken the EU more than twenty
years to move from the first discussions of data protection issues in the then
not yet directly elected European Parliament (1974) to the Data Protection
Directive.
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legal policy developments cannot be explained by looking simply at application areas and application specific developments.
Again, one must recall general political developments. There
have been other players emphasizing public interest and public
services. There had been national developments, most strongly
signaled first by the end of the Thatcher administration and
later with the Conservative government in the U.K. by 1997.
Although this did not lead to a recognizable change of the British position on telecommunications, these developments were
perceived as symbolic indicators of change.
As noted above, unemployment remained an important issue
in public debate. This is not the place to expand on unemployment and telecommunications liberalization and their complex
interrelations; reference is only made in view of the changes in
public opinion and its view on the role and responsibility of the
EU. Furthermore, certainly since 1989, and well before the
European crisis years already referred to, the end of East/West
confrontations favored centrifugal tendencies in the EU which
gained further momentum as a counterbalance to the intention
of the EU to become more integrated in the area of foreign and
military policy.
Last but not least, end users’ views gradually changed as
well. Changes brought by, or at least with, liberalization had
been welcome. Services had improved. Prices had gone down on
long-distance calls, but they had also gone up for local calls and
continue to do so. Choice had increased, but the burden of
choice had become heavier and information costs had increased
as well, leaving the consumer with an undercurrent of feeling
that there might always be a better choice than the one made
(and ironically because of these choices), which seems to lead to
a lingering feeling of being trapped, if not cheated.252
The Commission, of course, has not and will not stop at telecommunications. Other areas are undergoing similar changes:
energy and water, public banking and public transport and
(tentatively) public radio and television. This multi-front ap252. EOS Gallup Europe, The European Commission: The Situation of
Telecommunication Services in the Regions of the European Union, at
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/EOStudy/
Resid/accueil.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2002) (based on over 44,000 household interviews in 130 regions within the fifteen Member States, in conjunction with a survey of 7500 small companies).
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proach of the Commission with or without direct support from
the Council has also generated — as already shown in the reactions to the Green Paper on Convergence — a multi-front
opposition.
With its general loss of appeal, the EU also seemed to have
lost control over its regulatory playing field. The need for institutional reform, and the then upcoming Treaty of Amsterdam
in particular, allowed players to carry their sectoral concerns to
other levels. Players could choose to take the specific issue to
the national or to the European level, they could choose to turn
the specific issue into a general issue or they could choose a
combination thereof.253 This approach was strongly emphasized, for one, by the French government.254 Also, the Eur opean
courts increasingly seemed to have rediscovered the charm of
services of a general economic interest and specific state involvement.255 So, in European politics, concessions for services
in the general economic interest had to be made. The willingness to make such concessions was expressed in the Commission Communication on Services of General Interest in
Europe256 and in a 2000 update to the Communication.257 Furthermore, due to changes in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EC
Treaty now contains a specific article:
Article 16 (ex Article 7d)
Without prejudice to Articles 73, 86 and 87, and given the
place occupied by services of general economic interest in the
shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting
253. As regards these multi-player, multi-level politics, see generally Adrienne Héritier, The Politics of Public Services in European Regulation, in PREPRINTS
AUS
DER
M AX-PLANCK-P ROJEKTSGRUPPE
RECHT
DER
GEMEINSSCHAFTSGÜTER (2001).
254. The account provided by Héritier, id. at 11, slightly overemphasizes
the impact of French developments, most likely due to the source material
used.
255. See, e.g., Case T-106/95, Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurances (FFSA) & Others v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-229; Case C-392/92,
Municipality of Almelo and Others v. Energiebedrijfljsselmij NV, 1994 E.C.R.
I-1447; Case T-32/93, Ladbroke Racing Ltd. v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. II1015; Case C-320/91, Criminal Proceedings Against Paul Corbeau, 1993
E.C.R. I-2565.
256. See Services of General Interest, supra note 41.
257. See Communication from the Commission, Services of General Interest in Europe, COM(00)580 final [hereinafter Services of General Interest
2000].
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social and territorial cohesion, the Community and the Member States, each within their respective powers and within the
scope of application of this Treaty, shall take care that such
services operate on the basis of principles and conditions
which enable them to fulfil their missions.258

And public broadcasting, in particular, found special recognition in the Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the
Member States:
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES,
CONSIDERING that the system of public broadcasting in
the Member States is directly related to the democratic, social
and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve
media pluralism,
HAVE AGREED UPON the following interpretative provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty establishing the
European Community,
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European
Community shall be without prejudice to the com petence of
Member States to provide for the funding of public service
broadcasting insofar as such funding is granted to broadcasting organisations for the fulfilment of the public service remit
as conferred, defined and organised by each Member State,
and insofar as such funding does not affect trading conditions
and competition in the Community to an extent which would
be contrary to the common interest, while the realisation of
the remit of that public service shall be taken into account. 259

EC Treaty Article 16 remains rather guarded and the Communication on Services of General Interest sounds rather cautious, and defensive, particularly the 2000 amendment.260 All
these developments are indications that the tone has changed
and that the burden of argumentation may be shifting. Recently, services of general economic interest have even found
their place in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU:
Article 36
258. EC TREATY art. 16.
259. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts Protocol Annexed to the Treaty of the European Community - Protocol on the
System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 109,
109.
260. See generally EC TREATY art. 16; Services of General Interest 2000,
supra note 257.
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Access to services of general economic interest
The Union recognises and respects access to services of
general economic interest as provided for in national laws and
practices, in accordance with the Treaty establishing the
European Community, in order to promote the social and territorial coh esion of the Union. 261

Furthermore, consumer protection has gained considerable
momentum. Again quoting from the EC Treaty where, since
the changes introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam, consumer protection now has its own title:
TITLE XIV (ex Title XI)
CONSUMER PROTECTION
Article 153 (ex Article 129a)
1. In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Community shall
contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, education and to organise themselves in order to
safeguard their interests.
2. Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into
account in defining and implementing other Community policies and activities. 262

It should be remembered in this context that it was only in
1995 that consumer protection was seen as worthy of receiving
its own General Directorate. Again the Charter of Fundame ntal Rights reads: “Union policies shall ensure a high level of
consumer protection.”263
Finally, consumer protection has gained an even higher political standing against the background of yet another “Commission crisis,” this time in the area of agriculture. The reports
on the implementation of the regulatory tools in telecommunications become, in spite of the ever increasing annexes, more
concise. Unfortunately, but for obvious reasons, they emphasize quantitative data or approaches where qualitative statements are quantitatively operationalized.264 But, in the new
spirit of consumer orientation, even these reports can be sur261. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 36, 2000
O.J. (C 364) 1, 17 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights].
262. EC TREATY art. 153(1)-(2).
263. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 261, art. 38.
264. For the most recent data, see Sixth Report, supra note 95.
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prisingly blunt when assessing or trying to assess the current
situation of consumer protection in telecommunications:
There is still little evidence of a systematic effort at [the] national level to monitor the protection of consumers and the
promotion of users’ interests as regards telecommunications
services. While institutional arrangements vary from country
to country, there appears to be a disappointingly low level of
coordination between NRAs and other agencies responsible
for consumer protection. This makes it difficult to discern particular trends or problems at [the] EU level, even in relation
to the services and quality of service indicators the use of
which is obligatory under the EC fram ework.265

In sum, the climate is changing. It is against the background
of these changes that the new regulatory package will have to
be re-read and eventually implemented.
C. Conluding Observation: On Comparison and Uniqueness
The subject of the post-deregulatory landscape invites or insinuates at least comparison. To compare is a deliberate act in
which one is prepared to reduce differences, to move towards
generalizations to reach at least some common ground for comparison. Emphasizing the specifics of the EU environment and
of the European approach was driven not so much by an attempt to avoid comparison or to neglect common challenges
and common responses. Rather, this Article has attempted to
introduce some of the “ethnological” differences in regulatory
environments for telecommunications and to help to create —
generally — a more critical distance between “the foreign example” and the need to develop an intrinsic policy that absorbs
the specific cultural needs (but also the temporary fashions) of
one’s own regulatory environment. In doing so, from a perspective of historical and institutional observation, this Article echoes conclusions of the authors of another analysis who in contrast to this author have chosen a primarily economic and empirical approach. Olivier Boylaud and Giuseppe Nicoletti conclude their extensive empirical analysis Regulation, Market
Structure and Performance in Telecommunications:

265. Id. at 22.
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These findings underscore the limits of purely descriptive
cross-country comparisons of regulation and performance, insofar as they fail to account for economic and policy developments in different countries, as well as the danger of using
such analysis for policy purposes without an understanding of
the different markets and their specific characteristics.266

In fact, European telecommunications regulation, or at least
the examples chosen from this area, illustrate how issues apparently manageable mainly by reflections on economic efficiency remain deeply connected and dependent on economic,
but also on cultural and political developments of the European
region. Such phenomenon is due to the complex and specific
patterns of interaction between European players on the various levels provided to them by the specific structure of the EU.

266. OLIVIER BOYLAUD & GIUSEPPE NICOLETTI, REGULATION , M ARKET
S TRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 24 (OECD Econ.
Dep’t, Working Paper No. 237, 2000).

